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
PRELUDE TO FRATRICIDE: THE CARRANZA-VILLA SPLIT AND
FACTIONALISM IN THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION, 1913-1914

by


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B.A., University of Montana, 1984

Presented in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
University of Montana
1986

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


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Prelude to Fratricide: The Carranza-Villa Split and Factionalism in the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1914. (174 pp.)

Director: Manuel Machado



This study examines the critical period (1913-1914) of the Constitutionalist Revolution. It concludes that socio-economic differences separating Venustiano Carranza and Francisco "Pancho" Villa laid the groundwork for the ultimate factionalization of the Constitutionalist coalition. The study analyzes specific events of the revolution, expulsion of the Spanish from Chihuahua, the Benton Affair, the occupation of Veracruz, the Zacatecas campaign, and the convention of Aguascalientes, as catalysts for the split.

This study relied on both United States and Mexican primary sources. The backbone of the American sources included the Records of the Department of State Relating to the Foreign Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929 (Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington D. C.) and the Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914 (Washington D. C., Government Printing Office, 1922) as well as The New York Times and the El Paso Herald. The Main Mexican Sources were Vida Nueva, the villista newspaper published in Chihuahua beginning in 1914, and a series of documents entitled Ejército Constitucionalista División del Norte: Manifiesto del C. Gral Francisco Villa a la Nación y Documentos que Justifican el Desconocimiento del C. Venustiano Carranza como "Primer Jefe de la Revolución" (Chihuahua, Tipografía del Gobierno, 1914.) The Mexican sources and use of the El Paso Herald resulted from a research trip in the summer of 1985. During the trip the author visited many of the northern Mexican cities prominent during the revolution, which greatly aided the finished product.

In conclusion the study finds that Carranza must be assigned the majority of the blame for the split because of his attempt to contain Villa in the north and exclude him from participation in the success of the revolution. It does recognize that Villa did many things that antagonized Carranza, but Carranza, with the superior education and upbringing, should have foreseen the consequences of the split and the bloody civil war that followed.

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Preface

The sun beat incessantly on the Chihuahuan desert and the sparse ground covering radiated heat waves adding an unreal quality to the area. The temperature climbed past 85 degrees by nine o'clock that morning and the air was still. Only the railroad tracks of the Mexican Central interrupted the endless stretch of wasteland. In the distance black smoke filled the air as a coal driven train moved its way south. The train itself looked unusual for a 1914 cargo locomotive. The fifty or so cars carried a wide variety of horses, some looking half starved, others like they lived on grain and corn. On the top of the cars sat men with guns and bandoleros, some full, some empty. Women and children rode with the men, many cooking over impromptu stoves affixed to the roofs. The men wore no hats that day because orders had come from their leader that this would be the signal to identify friend from foe. All told, nearly 3,000 people, only half of them men, ready to die for the cause, rode this train, with five more following behind. Francisco "Pancho" Villa was advancing, preparing for another battle on his march toward Mexico City.

The revolution, begun by Francisco Madero in November 1910, brought to an end thirty-six years of stability in Mexico. The next decade saw chaos and turmoil destroy much of the good accomplished before the breakdown in political

stability. During the brief period that Villa and his nominal superior, Venustiano Carranza, fought Victoriano Huerta for control of Mexico, it seemed as if Mexico would once again unite on the road to peace. Yet once Villa and Carranza defeated their common enemy they were unable to reach mutually agreeable terms on what direction the future of Mexico should take. The result of their inability to come to terms in the latter months of 1914 doomed Mexico to another six years of violence and bloodshed. The origins of this split between Carranza and Villa will be investigated here. Personality differences compounded by the actual events of the Constitutionalist Revolution caused this split. The consequence of the split in the short term was a bloody civil war and in the long-term it excluded one of the major factions from a role in the reconstruction of Mexico.

Social differences between Villa and Carranza underscored much of the problem between the two men. Villa came from a poor peasant family while Carranza was born into wealth. Carranza could not forget that Villa was the same as any peon that worked on his hacienda, and he made sure Villa did not forget it either. Yet this difference in social background alone cannot account for the break between the two men in September of 1914. Once the Constitutionalist began to advance toward Mexico City, and with the defeat of Huerta, political friction exacerbated the tension caused by their different upbringings.

Moreover, prior to and during the success of the rebellion the two men argued over how to conduct relations with foreign governments. This also stemmed from their divergent social background because Carranza believed that Villa did not have the intelligence to understand foreign relations. Finally, as the animosity built between the two men, the military campaign south presented the immediate cause of the split. Carranza wanted to limit Villa's power in the areas he already controlled and ordered another general to attack Zacatecas. Villa believed that the conduct of war should be his sphere of influence and the split increasingly widened. Thus, friction caused by social, political and diplomatic causes brought about a rupture in the revolutionary coalition that plunged Mexico into civil war.

Sources always present a problem for the researcher. This study did not differ from the norm. Yet the voluminous Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929, (Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington D. C.), were a gold mine for the topic of the split between Villa and Carranza. Constantly preoccupied with the impending split of the Constitutionalist coalition, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and President Woodrow Wilson sent a variety of agents to Mexico to keep them informed on the course of the revolution. These documents were indispensable for this study. In the same vein, the Papers Relating to the Foreign

Relations of the United States 1914, (Washington D. C., Government Printing Office, 1922), yield a selected amount of information for the researcher. Not as complete as the State Department documents, the Foreign Relations volumes do provide a starting point.

Another important source of information used in this study were memoirs, specifically the Memoirs of Pancho Villa by Martin Luis Guzmán (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1965, translated by Virginia Taylor and the original Spanish edition, México D. F., CIA. General de Ediciones, 1951.) While this book must be used with care, it does provide a glimpse of Villa that is unavailable elsewhere. Two other memoirs give a more generalized view of Mexico during the era of the revolution. The first, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico by Edith O'Shaughnessy (New York, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1916), gives an account of life in Mexico city from 1911 to 1914. While mostly beyond the scope of this study, it did greatly aid in understanding life in Mexico in this turbulent time. The second is John Reed's Insurgent Mexico (New York, D. Appleton and Co., 1914). Reed gives a first hand account of life with a band of villistas during the early period of the revolt against Huerta and helped form the opening paragraph of this preface.

Contemporary articles and newspapers always provide a valuable source of information. This study greatly profited from the El Paso Herald which I was able to use as a result

of a research trip to Mexico in the summer of 1985. The index at the El Paso Public Library is one of the best that I have seen and made the use of the paper extremely helpful and easy. Vida Nueva, the villista paper published in Chihuahua City also proved indispensable. Begun in April 1914, it presented a decidedly slanted view favorable to Villa but in the era prior to the split between Villa and Carranza it presented both men in a very partisan light.

Secondary sources, while not the backbone of any study, provide a framework that helps establish the order of events. While this study used a wealth of secondary materials, two need specific mention. The first is Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years, (Charles Cumberland, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1972). This book contains a treasure of detailed information even though it takes a far too favorable view of Carranza. The second is Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's Executive Agents in Mexico, (Larry Hill, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1973. Emissaries deals with the United States' position in the revolution from the perspective of the agents that viewed the events of the revolution. Its only drawback is the lack of analysis of their performance in their roles in Mexico.

A study such as this does not result from the author alone. Others help every step of the way. Professor Manuel Machado proved an invaluable asset in my work. Pointing me

to sources, discussing interpretations, reading and editing the drafts, all greatly simplified the process. Furthermore he provided me the chance to go to Mexico as his research assistant and see the country for myself. This made much of what I wrote more than just an abstract endeavor. Traveling first to Chihuahua City via El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, I saw much of the state that Villa controlled. Then going from Chihuahua to Cananea, Santa Ana, Hermosillo, and our destination of Guaymas, he showed me most of northern Sonora. I can never fully express my thanks for the experience this trip provided. In the course of the two years working together we have become more than teacher and student but have become friends. For this too, I thank him.

Last and certainly not least I must thank my wife, Leslie. Putting up with my anxiety and stress while working on this project has made the end result all the more satisfying. I must also include my two daughters in my thanks because they can bring a smile to my face that at many times is missing after a long session at the typewriter. Thank you Molly and Jeannette, you have helped in ways you cannot understand. Finally, all errors in interpretation and fact are my own. I hope that I have been able to keep them to a bare minimum.

CHAPTER ONE

Madero's Tiger

"Madero has unleashed a tiger; let us see if he can control him," purportedly said Porfirio Díaz prior to¹ boarding the ship that took him into exile. An era had ended that day in May 1911. The thirty-five year porfiriato (1876-1911) saw Mexico enter the modern age. Coming to power at the end of fifty years of political and social turmoil, Díaz brought political stability to Mexico. To Díaz and his key supporters, the científicos, economic development meant progress. To insure this progress Díaz offered tax rebates, special concessions and a cheap, docile labor force to attract the foreign capital necessary to² transform Mexico.

The origins of the Carranza-Villa split of June through September 1914, can be traced to the years Porfirio Díaz ruled Mexico (1876-1911). Villa and Carranza grew into manhood in this era and became the men they would be in 1914. Villa grew up as a peon and then became the popular bandit. Carranza grew up in luxury and became intimately involved in the porfirian system. This divergence in social status laid the groundwork for tension during the Constitutionalist revolt. As Villa matured he developed a profound distrust for the upper-class, while Carranza took a

condescending attitude toward anyone from a class below himself. Thus the basis for the split between the two men can be found in the porfiriato. Then the Madero rebellion of 1910-1911 brought both Villa and Carranza into the forefront of Mexican politics. Moreover the development realized during the porfiriato aided the rebellion these two men nominally led. Not yet the leaders that they would be in 1913-1914, the roles Carranza and Villa played in the overthrow of Díaz contributed to their position after the fall of Madero.

Díaz' ability to remain in office resulted from the influence of key groups in the society that had an interest in maintaining the status quo. Chief among these was the professional army-officer class. The army hierarchy became a place for social mobility in a limited sense. Open mainly to the upper classes, the army did allow those of the lower classes with ability to rise in rank. Yet the profession became a political arena because, except for the Apache, Mayan, and Yaqui Indian campaigns and various internal disorders, the army did little to justify its existence. The military lacked an effective general command structure and the budgeted size of the army far outdistanced the number of men in uniform.³

General Victoriano Huerta exemplified the lower-class individual rising through the ranks of the porfirian army. Born in extreme northern Jalisco in 1854, Huerta rose

quickly through the ranks. He graduated from the Colegio Militar in 1877 and received a commission as a second lieutenant. In 1879 Díaz chose Huerta's plan for a Mexican General Staff. By 1902, Huerta had risen to the rank of brigadier general and general of division in 1912. One of the few generals with military experience since the defeat of the French, he served in both the Mayan and Yaqui campaigns as well as fighting against rebels in Guerrero, Sinaloa, and Tepic. A chance meeting with then Colonel Bernardo Reyes in 1879 gave Huerta a connection to a man who would eventually become Secretary of War. Yet he remained outside of the in-group, campaigning in the field instead of⁴ enjoying the good life in Mexico City.

In order to balance the political power of the military, Díaz assigned the bulk of the work of pacifying the countryside to the rurales, the rural police force. Originated by Benito Juárez, Díaz expanded and modernized this corps into an expert and feared mounted constabulary. By application of the ley fuga, shot while attempting escape, the rurales became the most feared group of men in Mexico. Trials for prisoners became scarce. Banditry, however, did not completely die out in the countryside. The main routes of travel did become as safe as anywhere in the Americas but this resulted from a heavy presence of the rurales. But the symbol of the rurales in their handsome uniforms fed the myth of stability in porfirian Mexico.

Banditry flourished in Mexico throughout the porfiriato. Díaz co-opted some of the bandits into the rurales, others lived the life of the outlaw. Yet the picture of Mexico⁵ seen by the world was of a safe, secure country.

The myth of safety drew entrepreneurs and the country began to expand economically. The best example of this growth can be seen in the construction of railroads. The first line in Mexico was the Mexican National Railroad linking Veracruz with Mexico City. A technical nightmare, the 420 kilometers took forty years to complete. By 1876, the year of completion, it was the only line in Mexico but the railroads in the southwestern United States were⁶ converging on the border.

In the next twenty years railroad construction boomed. The state of San Luis Potosí characterized the growth. Between 1880 and 1900, 15,000 miles of right-of-way were granted in the state. Owned and financed mostly by foreigners, the railroad linked the silver, copper, and lead mines to the port of Tampico or the factories of the United States through Ciudad Juárez. With improved transportation, costs decreased, and mineral profits escalated. In the critical period of the Constitutionalist revolt, the rebels used captured railroads to transport their troops the vast distances between battlefields and greatly benefitted from this porfirian development. The railroads also provided a communication network because construction of telegraph

lines paralleled the building of the railroad. The railroad telegraph also played an important role in the Constitutionalist revolt. When the turning point in relations between Villa and Carranza arrived in June of 1914, the two men spent six hours discussing the course of the revolution, Villa from the railroad telegraph station in Torreón and Carranza in the same office in Saltillo. In addition 74,254 kilometers of commercial telegraph line covered Mexico by 1911.⁷

Agricultural practices gained modern expertise during the porfiriato. Using centralized management, irrigation, distribution and rotation of crops, and exploitation of by-products agriculture entered the scientific age. Many Mexican-owned enterprises passed into hands of foreigners willing to make the investments that would bring profits. A prime example of this occurred in the rich cotton region of La Laguna in Coahuila. The Mexican owners of the Compañía de Tlahualilo allowed it to fall into bankruptcy. British and American investors bought it in 1903. Through original concessions the company had the right to 12 percent of the Nazas river. This sum jumped greatly in dry years because of the fixed amount represented by the percentage. In the dry years the company got their water first through an extensive canal leaving those producers down the line virtually dry. Branch rail lines connected the company to the gulf ports and the Mexican Central, which connected to

the United States. During the Constitutionalist revolt, Villa used the enormous amount of cotton grown in the area to help finance his army. Moreover the vast amount of land owned by the company underscored part of the agrarian problem.⁸

The concentration of land in the hands of a few individuals accelerated during the porfiriato. Luis Terrazas in the state of Chihuahua provided the best example of this phenomenon. He originally gained land from those large landholders who supported the French in the 1860's. The Apache problems of the 1870-1880's caused the draining away of people from the state. One feature of the constitution of 1857 allowed the confiscation of land not in use. Terrazas remained in the state and used this law to obtain extensive amounts of land. Additionally, Terrazas arranged influential marriages for his children, and an extended net of kinship consolidated his control. He ultimately controlled 6.5 million acres of land in the state and paid almost no property taxes. This vast amount of land supported a huge quantity of livestock. Villa confiscated the land in December 1913, and used the approximately half a million head of Terrazas cattle to feed and finance his army. Yet Terrazas never wholeheartedly supported Díaz, but in Chihuahua he became the symbol of porfirian authority.⁹ It took a political payoff to gain his support.

The Mexican Constitution of 1857 underwent many changes

during the porfiriato. The term of office of the president had been extended to six years, the office of Vice-President was established, and unlimited re-election was instituted. When Díaz won the election in 1904, political and social tension increased. Díaz also made the mistake of growing old. Seventy-four in 1904, whispers began to circulate as to whether Díaz could live to the end of his term. If he did live, many believed that his choice for Vice-President in 1910 would become his political successor. Yet Díaz surprised everybody by announcing in 1908 that he would not seek another term and that opposition parties would be allowed to form. It appeared as if political power would finally change hands.¹⁰

Political discontent gained a hold on Mexico because of porfirian cronyism. In many states those with economic power found themselves excluded from political participation because of porfirian support for another faction. In the State of Coahuila, Venustiano Carranza learned the hard way how the porfirian system worked. Born in 1859 and educated in the best Mexican schools, Carranza became involved in local politics in his hometown of Cuatro Ciénegas. As a presidio president he desired greater office but found himself blocked by Díaz' favorites. In 1893 he joined a rebellion against the porfirian governor and forced the latter to resign. One result of the 1893 Coahuilan revolt thrust Bernardo Reyes into Coahuilan politics as mediator of

the dispute. Carranza became one of Reyes supporters, representing the latter at a pro-Díaz convention in 1909. Following the 1893 revolt Carranza twice became Municipio (county) President of Cuatro Ciénegas (1893-1898) and became a deputy to the national congress in the latter year. In 1904 his position within the porfiriato became complete when he received porfirian support in his bid for National Senator. In 1908 he received the position as interim Governor of Coahuila. He then decided to run for the regular term in 1909, but the porfirians supported his opponent and Carranza was thus alienated.¹¹

In the renewed political freedom of 1908-1909, General Bernardo Reyes, Minister of War, became a logical choice to succeed Díaz. Popular with the army and some of the upper-class, Reyes gained the support of strong political clubs. His efforts constituted more of a move toward the Vice-Presidency than for the position as chief executive. But he remained loyal to Díaz and accepted a military study mission to Europe, a Mexican form of political exile. Supporters of the Flores Magón brothers revived the Mexican Liberal Party (PLM) but did not gather much popular support because their policies had drifted too far to the left. A group of political moderates, between Madero and the PLM also agitated but never actually organized. A smattering of other local parties also entered the political arena. Yet none gathered the popular appeal that Francisco Madero and

his "Anti-reelectionist" party did.¹²

Madero, the son of a wealthy hacendado from the state of Coahuila and a success in his own right, gathered popular support. He sat on the board of directors of the largest cottonseed oil company in Mexico and spent many years running one of his father's haciendas. In response to the Creelman article, Madero published a book entitled The Presidential Election of 1910, written in 1908, in which he predicted that Díaz would in fact run again. Madero used this slender thread to advance his own candidacy. The anti-reelectionist party attributed its name to his book. Madero wanted political change but meant to leave it at that. As Madero had predicted, Díaz did reverse himself in May 1908, and offered himself for reelection.¹³

As the election approached and Madero's popularity increased, he became a threat to porfirian interests. In June 1910, Díaz had Madero arrested for fermenting rebellion and insulting Federal authorities, thus cancelling his opposition. Surprising no one, Díaz easily won the election. Family connections allowed Madero to arrange bail after the election and, when free, he promptly fled Mexico, arriving in the United States in 1910. He finally reached the grudging conclusion that the only way to effect political change was through revolution. Thus he announced his plan de San Luis Potosí. In order to avoid violating the neutrality laws of the United States, he post-dated the

manifesto to his last day in Mexico. It had the desired effect because no charges of neutrality violations, attempting to overthrow a foreign government from the United States, were filed against him. Although he did make a grievous mistake, he gave the date, November 20, 1910, for¹⁴ initiating hostilities.

By giving the date to begin military action, Madero allowed Díaz to crack down on his opposition. When Madero reentered Mexico in November 1910, significant support failed to materialize. Revolt did begin in a variety of places, but only in small groups. This failure to get the Madero rebellion going in November became the last gasp of the porfiriato. The use of guerrilla tactics by the rebels forced the Federal Army into a counter-insurgency war. The Federals could not stop the rebels because they found themselves outnumbered in most engagements and counter-insurgency demanded superiority. The lack of ammunition further hampered the defensive nature of the Federal campaign. Money for bullets had somehow found its way into the pockets of the Federal Commanders. This lack of munitions invariably hurt morale and led to desertion. Yet the widespread, regional nature of the revolution became the¹⁵ decisive factor in the overthrow of Díaz.

Revolutionary activity began in northern Mexico prior to Madero's call for military action. Pascual Orozco, Jr. instigated guerrilla warfare in the state of Chihuahua in

October 1910. The son of a store owner, Orozco made his living driving mule teams loaded with gold and silver out of the Sierra Madre Mountains. When an important contract went to a rival, one of Díaz's favorites, Orozco went into rebellion. Madero co-opted Orozco's force through connections with Abraham González, President of the chihuahuense anti-reelectionist club. This gave Madero a semi-independent and successful military movement in the interior of Mexico.

Also in Chihuahua, Francisco "Pancho" Villa joined Madero's rebellion. Villa, born Doroteo Arango in Durango in 1878, took up the trade of outlaw as a result of a dispute between himself and the son of the hacendado to whom his family owed allegiance.¹⁷ Working primarily in the states of Durango and Chihuahua, Villa became a legend and a hero to the lower classes. The uniqueness of the north, especially Chihuahua, played a large part in the acquisition of his status. Originally settled by military colonies opposed to the Apaches, the chihuahuenses retained an independence not found in other parts of Mexico. The large number of wild cattle also fueled Villa's rise to fame. The people of Chihuahua believed that the cattle were free for the taking, but as the land began to be claimed by hacendados, the cattle became possessions. Livestock that once seemed part of the public domain now could only be taken illegally. Thus Villa the bandit became Villa the

hero, flaunting his skills before the porfirian authorities. González recruited Villa also, offering him the chance to drop the outlaw trade for the legitimacy of a rebel. Villa recognized the fine line between bandit and rebel and jumped at the chance and became part of Orozco's¹⁸ army.

In the state of Morelos, a thousand miles south, rebellion began in 1909. Emiliano Zapata centered his opposition on the attempt to retain and regain land lost to the hacendados in the area. Taking advantage of the land law of 1894, the hacendados confiscated lands that had no clear title but had been ejido lands since before the arrival of Cortez. Zapata, a horse trainer on one of the large haciendas, became the leader of a group of local peasant uprisings. A breakdown in the porfirian political structure in the state assisted in advancing the revolt onward. Since the bands were made up of peasants, progress in the rebellion stopped when planting or harvesting time came. The rebellion never succeeded in moving very far outside Morelos but did cause an added drain of manpower¹⁹ that Díaz needed in the north.

Díaz's decision to resign came from a conscious reaction to the bloodshed caused by the internal strife. A rebel victory in early May 1911, at the important border city of Ciudad Juárez, led by Pascual Orozco and Francisco Villa, helped him reach the decision. He resigned on May

25, 1911, and boarded the Hamburg-American Line Steamer Ypiranga for exile in Europe where he died on July 2, 1915.²⁰

Francisco León de la Barra, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, became Provisional President in May 1911, with elections scheduled for November. In the five months that de la Barra held the executive power, Madero did not force issues upon the interim president. This caused multiple problems, the most important being the open antagonism of Zapata. De la Barra ordered Victoriano Huerta to enter Morelos in August 1911 and disarm the zapatistas. Although Zapata had agreed to Madero's request to disperse his army, Zapata argued that some of his troops had to retain their arms to keep the peace in the region. This prompted de la Barra's order to Huerta and thus Zapata remained in rebellion. On November 25, 1911, four months prior to Orozco's repudiation of Madero, Zapata announced the famous Plan de Ayala which curiously enough recognized Pascual Orozco as leader, with the provision that if Orozco declined, Zapata would take control. Orozco never declined. In addition, the social dislocations caused by the revolution gave Madero multitudinous problems to face²¹ when he came to power.

Francisco Madero assumed the presidency of Mexico at the end of November 1911 following one of the freest elections in Mexican history. But he had little support

among the old ruling class, the army, the native elite, and the foreign capitalists. He realized that some type of social reform was needed but believed that political reform would solve all of Mexico's problems. He also antagonized many of the revolutionaries. Orozco became disenchanted with the Madero government when he did not receive an important position in the government. A national hero in the anti-Díaz revolution, Orozco believed that he had earned the position of Secretary of War. His appointment as commander of the Chihuahua Rurales hurt his pride.²²

Madero further hurt himself by his handling of the Federal Army. He decided to keep the army intact and disband the victorious revolutionary army. His former enemies became the foundation of his regime. Many of the revolutionary heroes were forced into retirement. Francisco Villa, one of the heroes of the battle of Ciudad Juárez, retired to Chihuahua to open a butcher shop. Madero's action had a two-fold effect. Many of the revolutionaries resented Madero's overlooking them, and the career soliders resented the placing of revolutionaries in positions of importance. Thus, Madero lost the unqualified support of the agency upon which he based his survival.²³

The first serious military threat against Madero failed to materialize. Bernardo Reyes returned from his European study mission prior to the November 1911 elections. Although promised the portfolio of War if he did not oppose

Madero in the election, supporters convinced him to run. A roughing up by Madero supporters and a refusal by the Provisional Government to delay the election convinced Reyes that safer territory existed north of the border. Once in the United States, Reyes began to plot rebellion. He set the date to begin action for December 1 but was arrested by United States authorities for violation of the neutrality law. Before trial, though, he slipped into Mexico and attempted to generate support for his cause. The support failed to materialize. On December 25th he turned himself in to authorities in the state of Nuevo León and ultimately found himself in the Prisión Militar de Santiago Tlaltelolco in Mexico City. Madero had weathered the first storm, but
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others followed.

Two ominous events unfolded in January 1912. The first resulted from a meeting between Madero and Orozco early in the month. What actually transpired never became public knowledge, but on January 26 Orozco officially tendered his resignation. Madero convinced Orozco that his service to the revolution was not yet completed and to remain at his post until March. The second event concerned revolts in favor of Emilio Vázquez Gómez. Vázquez Gómez believed that his brother had been unfairly treated by being dropped from the Madero ticket in favor of José María Pino Suárez and meekly called for rebellion. Feeble action did take place in Zacatecas, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua, but the only serious

episode occurred in Ciudad Juárez. An uprising by the garrison there caused enough concern for Madero to send the chief of the Chihuahua Rurales, Pascual Orozco, to quell it. Orozco arrived on February 3 and made two speeches that convinced the malcontents to surrender. The leaders were sent to prison in Chihuahua City and the uprising was over.
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In late January 1912, Abraham González, governor of Chihuahua and Secretary of Gobernación, received a message from Francisco Villa. Villa informed González of a meeting that took place between the "Científicos" of the State and Pascual Orozco. González realized that this portended problems and resigned his post in the Madero Government to resume his post as governor of Chihuahua. Orozco at barely 30 years of age was liked by all classes in Chihuahua. The hacendados in the state, wishing to use his prestige, manipulated the seed of wounded pride to edge him toward rebellion. In the first days of March 1912 Orozco resigned his position as leader of the Chihuahua Rurales and on the 4th he declared himself in rebellion against the Madero Government.
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The Orozco rebellion constituted the first serious threat to the Madero Government. He quickly put together an army of 5000 men, four-fifths armed, and routed the first federal army he faced. He issued the mandatory plan, Plan Orozquista, and the principles for agrarian reform agreed

with all the major articles of the Plan de Ayala. Orozco quickly took Chihuahua City which was defended by Francisco Villa. Governor González had ordered Villa and his 600 irregulars to defend the city but was routed by Orozco on the outskirts of that city. The rebellion quickly gained
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momentum.

The most serious blow delivered to the rebellion in its early days came not from Mexico but from the United States. On March 13, 1912, President William Howard Taft declared an embargo on all arms deliveries to Mexico and caused rebel hostility toward the United States. Orozco's antagonism towards the United States government was such that the American Smelting and Refining Company found it inadvisable to ship industrial dynamite to Chihuahua. Arms were also sent to protect Americans in Veracruz, Tampico, Guaymas, and Guadalajara. The embargo did not include clothing, dry goods, hardware, or foodstuffs, but these were not what Orozco needed. A rebel attempt to obtain arms from Canada, shipped through the United States, was foiled. Ultimately the embargo on arms doomed the Orozco rebellion to
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failure.

On March 23, 1912, Orozco won a major battle outside the town of Rellano. This opened the route to Mexico City but Orozco was unable to follow up his victory because of limited supplies of ammunition, a direct result of the United States embargo. Madero responded by sending an army

north under the command of Victoriano Huerta. Huerta organized his 8000 man regular army at Torreón, and, when Villa arrived there, he received orders to place himself under Huerta's command. Huerta's forces clashed with Orozco's on May 22-23, again at Rellano but with the opposite result. The rebels were scattered by Huerta, and he became a national hero. Huerta then occupied the major Chihuahua cities and left the countryside to the rebels who had degenerated to little more than bandits.²⁹

One result of the Orozco rebellion did not have anything to do with the orozquistas. At the end of May, when Huerta had retired to the cities, Villa sent a message to Madero complaining that his commander-in-chief was not doing enough to stabilize conditions in the countryside. Huerta intercepted the message but did not take any action against Villa, but further problems resulted over the ownership of a purebred Arabian horse. After the battle of Rellano, in which Villa's forces acted as the vanguard, Villa confiscated a horse he found in Jiménez. Huerta ordered it returned, but Villa refused. Subsequently, he did not respond to an order to come to Huerta's office.³⁰ Thus Huerta ordered Villa's execution for insubordination.

Villa explained that he had been suffering from a fever and that was why he could not come to Huerta's office. The guard escorting him to his execution was unwilling to listen. As the squad prepared him for execution Colonel

Rubio Navarrete interceded in Villa's behalf. He succeeded in delaying the order, informed Raúl Madero, the president's brother, and then went to see Huerta. Huerta refused to countermand the order, but when he received a telegram from President Madero, in response to a plea from his brother, he agreed to send Villa to Mexico City. A court martial found Villa guilty of insubordination, and Villa was interned in the same prison as Bernardo Reyes. Villa's hatred for Huerta found its origins in this episode.³¹

The last unsuccessful rebellion occurred in October 1912, under the command of Félix Díaz, nephew of the deposed dictator. Díaz captured the city of Veracruz but was unable to convince the commander of the Navy in the harbor nor the commander of the island fortress of San Juan de Ulloa to join him. Then instead of expanding his control to other cities in the State of Veracruz, he waited for a popular uprising to assist his cause. Federal forces crushed the Díaz rebellion on October 23 and captured Díaz. Many argued for Diaz' execution but Madero decided to spare his life and condemned him to prison in San Juan de Ulloa. He ultimately found himself in prison in Mexico City when a plan to liberate him from Veracruz Harbor was uncovered. Madero had survived another attempt to oust him from power.³²

The rebellions did have a disastrous effect on the economic conditions in the countryside. Vast amounts of land remained uncultivated and the destruction of railroad

and telegraph lines further hurt the economy. What little industry there was closed down. Of the five smelters of the American Smelting and Refining Company in Chihuahua, four remained idle. All this had a negative impact on the banking industry. Credit stopped. A run on the Banco Central, parent branch of nearly all the state banks, caused the collapse of many provincial banks. At least nine state governments were at or near bankruptcy. The national government also had its monetary problems. The reserves Madero had inherited from the Díaz regime had disappeared. Some of it obviously went to settle the unrest in the countryside, but rumor had it that much of it lined the pockets of Madero's relatives, who filled his government. The National Government needed a loan to pay the foreign debt that Díaz constantly met. Yet by January 1913, with no major rebellion against his rule, Madero seemed to be in control of the country.

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The growth of the Mexican economy during the long tenure of Porfirio Díaz, while bringing urban Mexico into the modern world, did generate a vast degree of mainly middle to upper-class political discontent. By not fulfilling his promise to retire, Díaz helped focus the discontent and planted the seeds of Francisco Madero's triumph. Madero's problems began even before he took office. Rebellions against Madero seemed to dominate his first year in office with the inherent dislocations

compounding his problems. Yet as the new year of 1913 got underway it seemed as if Madero's government had turned back its most determined and capable foe.

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CHAPTER TWO

"A Man of Obscure Antecedents"

The illusion of stability that seemed to mark the early days of 1913, masked the last gasp of the Madero regime. Madero had in fact unleashed forces beyond his control. Madero's inability to keep the revolutionary factions together ultimately led to his downfall. A seemingly minor barracks revolt brought Madero's term as President of Mexico to an end. His successor, General Victoriano Huerta, faced the same problems as Madero and Díaz. Rebellion in the north against Huerta caused the able general many hardships. When the factions that made up the northern revolt coalesced around Venustiano Carranza, Huerta had as his first duty as President the pacification of his country. The Constitutionalists, as Carranza's rebels became known, generated mass support and also the support of the United States and President Woodrow Wilson. But like the porfiriato, Madero's presidency and the early part of the Constitutionalist revolt led to friction between the new factions, namely Carranza's and Francisco Villa's. As the northern revolution gained momentum, so did the problem of holding together the new coalition. The inability of the coalition to remain together did not actually manifest itself in the first year of the rebellion. Nevertheless the

groundwork was there and in the second year it became decisive.

With the majority of the leaders of the major rebellions in jail and their followers dispersed, Francisco Madero seemed to have the country finally headed down a peaceful road. Rebel activity did continue but was sporadic, more like an organized type of banditry. United States Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, continued to send reports that conditions would not improve, but with no organized rebellion ongoing against Madero, it seemed as if a new era had descended upon Mexico. Madero had spent almost the entire treasury putting down the various uprisings but believed he could rebuild the country. Pancho Villa did send word from the United States, to where he fled in October of 1912, to Abraham González of a plot to overthrow Madero but not much was made of it. Madero believed that he¹ had things under control.

On February 9, 1913, a barracks revolt began in Mexico City with the release of Félix Díaz and General Bernardo Reyes from the Military Prison of Santiago Tlaltelolco by the troops of General Manuel Mondragón. The plan envisaged General Reyes attacking the National Palace while Díaz attacked the Cuadela, Mexico City's main arsenal. Their efforts were only partially successful. General Reyes did take the National Palace but a counter-attack by General Lauro Villar, commander in chief of the Federal Army, drove

the forces of General Reyes from the palace. Both Generals Reyes and Villar received mortal wounds in the engagement. Díaz had more success. He captured the arsenal and therein entrenched his supporters. Madero found himself in dire straits. He faced a major rebellion in the capital without² a loyal commander of the military.

Madero turned to General Victoriano Huerta to save his regime. Huerta had returned to the capital allegedly for medical treatment at the time of the Félix Díaz uprising in Veracruz, and Madero assigned him the responsibility of suppressing the revolt. Although closely linked to Reyes for many years, apparently Huerta was not intimately involved with the plot. But after the death of General Reyes his participation became more active. He pretended to besiege the arsenal but gave Díaz advanced knowledge of any attack. The attackers were repulsed and not coincidentally the troops still loyal to Madero mounted the assaults.³ Madero's term in office was about to come to an end.

United States Ambassador Wilson surpassed the bounds of diplomacy and became intimately involved in the overthrow of Madero. H. L. Wilson's first act in the struggle was to demand protection from Félix Díaz for foreign nationals because the Ciudadela was in the legation district. The State Department approved this action adding that it did not imply any recognition of the rebels' belligerency. H. L. Wilson went further by not actively insuring Madero's life.

Ambassador Wilson told Huerta that as military commander he must do what he thought best for Mexico. He also told many people that he could not interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico. Yet he became dramatically interventionist on February 18.⁴

In a meeting at the American Embassy on the night of February 18, Díaz and General Huerta came to an agreement on the process of overthrowing Madero. On February 19, 1913, President Madero and Vice-President José María Pino Suárez wrote, "In view of the events which have occurred since yesterday . . . we formally resign our posts . . ."⁵ That evening, following Constitutional procedure, the Secretary of Foreign Relations, Pierre (Pedro) Lascuráin, assumed the presidency. He then appointed General Huerta Secretary of Gobernación (Interior) the next ranking cabinet position in line for succession. Lascuráin ended his fifty-six minute presidency with his resignation. Thus General Huerta became the Constitutional President of Mexico. Each step of the process received the approval of the Chamber of Deputies, yet at some point in the process the quorum was lost, casting some doubt on the legitimacy of the succession.⁶ Moreover the story did not end with Madero's resignation.

The topic of what to do with Madero and Pino Suárez dominated the discussion in a Cabinet meeting on the morning of February 22. The cabinet agreed that in order to maintain peace the president and vice-president could not be

released. Rodolfo Reyes believed that the two must be killed, but Huerta said that since he had guaranteed their lives his military reputation would not allow that course. He then left the meeting to attend to some other matter. Those remaining, including Félix Díaz, agreed that Madero and Pino Suárez must be killed and that it would have to be done behind Huerta's back. They formulated a plan that took place that night while Huerta was at a reception at the United States Embassy.⁷

Late in the evening of February 22, Francisco Madero and José María Pino Suárez were taken from the National Palace and shot. The official report of the government stated that while moving the president and vice-president to the Penitentiary, supposedly to make them more comfortable, the party was attacked. In the ensuing struggle Madero and Pino Suárez were killed. Huerta's exact role in the murders has yet to be substantiated, but as president he was responsible for the actions of his followers. Huerta lost any possible support for his coup with the death of Madero and Pino Suárez. Yet Huerta had only two choices following the assassinations, abandon his cabinet or accept what they had done. He choose the latter but there was one political casualty. Félix Díaz found himself outside the circle of power.⁸ Huerta then turned to consolidating his support.

On February 18, Huerta notified all the State Governors of his assumption of the executive powers. He demanded

immediate answers from each on whether they recognized him as the chief executive. Some, such as Ramon Cepeda of San Luis Potosí, granted him unconditional support. Others, such as Antonio Rivera of Veracruz, remained noncommittal. Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila asked for and received emergency powers from the State Legislature but did not recognize Huerta because the constitutional process had not yet been instituted. Yet he did not declare against Huerta, thus allowing negotiations to remain open. Huerta did gain support from a surprising source. Pascual Orozco immediately recognized Huerta. This had the effect of bringing many vacillators into Huerta's camp. For a short time it seemed as if it would also bring Zapata's support, but that hope by the new chief executive was quickly⁹ killed. Only two governors immediately rejected Huerta's¹⁰ claim to the Presidency and for different reasons.

Governor José María Maytorena reported that Sonora remained quiet following Huerta's coup. He noted the possibility of recognition but also added the probability of revolution. The murder of Madero outraged most of Sonora, but Maytorena was unwilling to test the strength of the new government and requested sick leave. The State government granted his request and Maytorena left for the safety of the¹¹ United States. The Sonoran Legislature chose Ignacio Pesqueira as acting governor and agreed to reject Huerta's demand for recognition. Pesqueira then appointed Alvaro

Obregón¹ as commander of the Sonoran "State Forces" in opposition to federal interference on state sovereignty. Thus they did not call themselves revolutionaries. Obregón's military skills came to light during the Orozco rebellion. This small landholder did not participate in the Madero rebellion but did help quell the Orozco revolt within Sonora. Once in the United States, Maytorena advised the United States Government to deny Huerta recognition. He also loaned Pancho Villa money to finance a planned return¹² to Mexico.

Villa's Chihuahua gave a different response to Huerta's demand for internal recognition. Governor Abraham González immediately rejected Huerta's call but was not able to carry out any action. He had earned the hatred of the strong Terrazas clan when he collected taxes for the undervaluations of their property. Thus he did not have the support of the strongest financial group in the state. On the twenty-second, following Madero's death, Major José Alessio Robles threw González into jail. General Antonio Rabago became interim governor and dissolved the state legislature on the twenty-fifth. Late in the night of March 6, González was taken from the Government Building and put on a train bound for Mexico City. That was the last that was ever seen of Gonzalez. With the upper-classes and the Federal Army in control of Chihuahua it was up to men of lower origins to lead the revolution, men such as Manuel

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Chao, Tomás Urbina, and Francisco Villa.

Villa reentered Mexico near Juárez on March 8, 1913, with eight men. Villa's decision to return to Mexico to oppose Huerta stemmed from a variety of reasons. The most obvious came from the fact that Huerta had ordered his execution in 1912. On a more subtle level, Villa's opposition resulted from his attitude towards Madero and González. Both men treated him with respect and dignity, something very few from the upper-classes did. As the consul at Durango described him: Villa was "A man of obscure antecedents, of little education and less refinement . . ."

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"Thus in the company of those of better breeding he felt inferior and when treated in a condescending manner he always reacted negatively. Neither González nor Madero treated him that way, and this made him look up to and admire the two men. At González's funeral tears rolled down his face as he walked beside the hearse. It was said that

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"Villa was a defender of the poor and Madero's avenger."

The man that ultimately became his nominal superior made the

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mistake of treating him as something less than himself.

At the time of Madero's resignation, Venustiano Carranza told Huerta; "If Señor Madero and the lawyer Pino Suárez have freely and spontaneously renounced their offices, either by weakness or cowardice, there is no

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remedy; Huerta is the President of the Republic . . ."

Carranza and Madero were never on the best of terms. Madero

realized Carranza's ties to Bernardo Reyes but supported him for the Coahuilan Governorship because he preferred a Reyist Carranza to any corralista, (supporters of Diaz's vice-presidential candidate.) At the outbreak of the 1910 revolution Carranza delayed in joining Madero but when he did he armed his peons and led them into battle like a feudal lord. In December 1912, Carranza became involved in a dispute with Madero. Madero dropped the federal funds that paid for state troops under state control. Later in the same month Carranza gathered representatives of the governors of the states of Chihuahua, Sonora, San Luis Potosí, and Aguascalientes to discuss the possibility of rebellion. The only thing that kept Carranza loyal was the barracks revolt in Mexico City.¹⁸

Carranza's ties to Huerta went back at least to 1893 through their mutual mentor Bernardo Reyes. Carranza stalled in declaring his opposition to Huerta's coup because of the lack of the money with which to finance opposition. His state was one of those that teetered on the brink of bankruptcy, and he used the time to negotiate with Huerta for financial support. Carranza hoped to arrange for the federally funded state troops that Madero had discontinued. He also negotiated with bankers within the state for a loan. When Huerta denied Carranza the financial assistance that his own state bankers did, he openly proclaimed against Huerta.¹⁹

Carranza's political outlook consisted of 19th century liberalism. The social reforms needed by the country were not that important to Carranza, but he used them to attract support from a broad spectrum of Mexicans. He believed that preservation of the Constitution of 1857 was the tantamount goal of the revolution against Huerta. He participated in the defense of the porfiriato and was a large landholder, aloof, cultured, and anti-clerical. He generated little excitement. When he boarded a train at Monterrey in July 1914, reported the Consul at Saltillo, the crowd " . . . stood regarding each other with that dumb expression on their faces like so many cattle."²⁰ Carranza saw no place for rash confiscations of land, encouragement of labor unions, or factory legislation. What land he did confiscate went to his loyal followers as a type of payoff. Edith O'Shaughnessy, wife of the 'Chargé d'Affairs to Mexico City after June 1913, described him as physically timid, greedy, and quiet. Carranza viewed Villa as a good soldier but also as an ignorant peasant and treated him that way. But in March 1913, none of this had yet manifested itself.²¹

One month after Madero's death the revolution gained increasing momentum. Villa quickly recruited 600 men. Toribio Ortega threatened Ojinaga. Rosalio Hernández and Tomás Urbina harassed southeastern Chihuahua. Manuel Chao attacked Parral and Maclovio Herrera captured Namiquipa. They quickly forced the federales into defense of the major

cities, but the armies were still small and scattered, limited to guerrilla fighting. Still they quickly forced the federales to defend the major cities. Carranza attempted to take Saltillo, capital of Coahuila, but was beaten back. On March 26, 1913, Carranza announced the Plan de Guadalupe. Basically, it withdrew recognition from Huerta and those governors who recognized the new chief executive. Additionally, it named Carranza as First Chief of the rebels, calling themselves "Constitutionalists." All in all, it represented a very watered down platform with little mention of specifics. Yet it set the original goals of the
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Constitutionalist revolution.

In April 1913 the governors of Coahuila and Sonora and the rebels of Chihuahua met in Monclova, Coahuila, to discuss joint military action against Huerta. The two governors, Carranza and Pesqueira, agreed to accept the Plan de Guadalupe as the goal of the revolution. The Coahuila Legislature approved this action immediately while the Sonoran Legislature debated the issue until that summer, when they finally gave their consent. Villa and the chihuahuense rebels moved more slowly. Villa reluctantly agreed to recognize the plan and Carranza as First Chief but made it understood that he would retain control of Chihuahuan issues. Carranza put further pressure on Huerta and his supporters in May by reinvoking Juárez's Law of January of 1862. That law made it illegal for Mexicans, upon

the pain of death, to assist the French. Carranza applied it to all supporters of Huerta. Thus the north, united in its opposition to Huerta, had given the new president cause for worry. Huerta had further preoccupations because less than a month after the death of Madero a moralistic Princeton Professor and Governor of New Jersey was elected as the²³ twenty-eighth President of the United States.

The murder of Madero horrified Woodrow Wilson, and his advisors assured him that Huerta was intimately involved in the crime. Wilson believed that General Huerta usurped political power unconstitutionally. Thus, he summed up his policy in Mexico as: "Every phase of the Mexican situation is based on the condition that those in de facto control of the government must be relieved of that control before²⁴ Mexico can realize her Manifest Destiny." Wilson asserted that the United States had the right to test the legitimacy of any government in Latin America, and Huerta did not pass the test. Wilson believed that Huerta assumed power through force and any government that came to power in such a fashion had to be oppressive. Wilson refused to see the capable men in Huerta's cabinet, and, as time went on, Huerta instituted more reforms than either Madero before him or Carranza after him. Wilson, not trusting the professional diplomats that formed the consular service, instituted a seldom used type of diplomacy, the Executive Agent.²⁵

Wilson and his new Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, looked upon the State Department staff as charlatans. Theodore Roosevelt had done away with the spoils system in 1906 by placing all ministers except Ambassadors on a civil service system. Taft continued the policy by establishing a Bureau of Appointments to review applications and give exams for diplomatic posts. Wilson and his Secretary did not trust the "Republicans" that came to dominate the foreign service. Thus he revived the seldom used Executive Agent. Many of Wilson's Mexican Executive Agents possessed talent, but most of these "deserving Democrats" did not speak Spanish and knew next to nothing about Mexico. Yet from their reports the new president²⁶ formed his policy towards Mexico.

Wilson studied the situation and sent a variety of agents to Mexico. He announced his policy in Mexico in an address to Congress in August 1913. The president urged all Americans to leave Mexico because of the political instability. He said "while we wait" the United States would diligently watch the Mexican situation. He continued the arms embargo and would not recognize any government in Mexico. He refused to take sides or be an umpire between the two sides. The United States Government would practice infinite patience in the ongoing struggles. The press had a field day with the president's policy dubbing it "Watchful Waiting," and throughout 1913 he followed his designated

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course.

By September 1913, the revolution in Chihuahua had begun to be much more professional. On September 29, Tomás Urbina, Maclovio Herrera, Calixto Contreras, Aguirre Benavides, Benjamin Yuciar, Juan García, Juan Medina, and Francisco Villa agreed that their forces must join together under a unified command structure. The caudillos finally decided upon Villa as their overall leader and Medina, a former Federal commander, drew up a command structure based on division size. The División del Norte was born.²⁸

Villa moved immediately, and on October 1, 1913, Torreón fell to the rebels for the first time. The fall of Torreón had two effects. First it gave Villa a vast amount of munitions but more importantly train engines and rolling stock. Because Villa could not obtain arms and munitions from the United States, due to the arms embargo, he needed to get them from the federales. Torreón held a vast supply of arms due to its strategic location. Villa and his followers now had the ability to travel in style. Secondly, it had a profound effect on the Federals. It precipitated the dissolution of the National Legislature, elected at the same time as Madero, on October 11, 1913.²⁹

What looked like a collapse in Federal ability to wage war, quickly turned around. On October 12, 1913, Sir Lionel Carden of Great Britain presented his credentials to officials of the Huerta government. The rest of Europe

followed suit. Huerta now had de facto recognition for his government because British custom recognized any de facto government. Huerta's fortunes also changed in Torreón. After the División del Norte's victory at that important railroad junction, Villa left a poorly armed garrison and moved north. He thereby allowed the huertistas to re-occupy this important railroad junction with little effort. Yet Villa was not yet done within the State.³⁰

Villa now readied his troops for the taking of the State of Chihuahua. On November 5, 1913 he threw his entire division against Ciudad Chihuahua. The well-entrenched Federals and colorados repulsed the rebels for two days. On 7 November Villa disengaged from the attack and retreated south because of dwindling supplies of ammunition. There he planned his most spectacular raid of the rebellion. On 13 November he moved 2000 of his army around Chihuahua under the cover of darkness and ambushed a coal train from Ciudad Juárez. He then forced the federal telegrapher to contact Juárez and report that the track was destroyed and that he could see a dust cloud, possibly made by the rebels. The reply ordered the train to return to Juárez. Villa loaded the train with his men and the train covertly brought his force across the Federal lines into Juárez. The Federal garrison surrendered on the fifteenth without firing a shot. Villa once again had captured Mexico's main port of entry.³¹

The Federal commander in Chihuahua, General Salvador Mercado, responded immediately. At dawn on 23 November the forces of Huerta under the command of Mercado and the rebel forces under Villa met in battle at Tierra Blanca, between Juárez and Chihuahua. For two days they fought to a standstill. On the twenty-fifth Villa ordered his center to pull back and Mercado responded by ordering his infantry to follow up this seemingly rebel weakness. Villa was ready with a massed cavalry charge and when the Federals overextended themselves, Villa smashed through the enemy line. The rout was on. The Federals retreated to Chihuahua and then continued northeast to Ojinaga, on the United States-Mexican border. One of the civilians to run to Ojinaga with Mercado was Luis Terrazas. The once most powerful man in Chihuahua crossed into the United States and passed the rest of the revolution in El Paso, Texas. On January 10, 1914, Villa smashed the last remaining Federal outpost at Ojinaga, again with a massed cavalry charge. The whole state of Chihuahua now belonged to the former cattle
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rustler.

On December 21, 1913, after the División del Norte took possession of Ciudad Chihuahua, State capital of Chihuahua, Generals Maclovio Herrera, Jose Rodríguez and Manuel Chao named Francisco Villa civilian governor of Chihuahua. For military reasons, they allowed Villa to be absent as much as necessary. Villa's contemporaries viewed him in a variety

of ways. Clarence Barrows, dean of the Graduate School of Social Sciences at the University of California at Berkley, said of Villa: "In my opinion he is the most temperate and reasonable leader in Mexico."³³ Alvaro Obregón, however, described Villa as "a man who has trouble controlling his nerves."³⁴ Obregón's view probably fit closer to the actual Villa. Yet both views had a ring of truth. Villa could be both "temperate" and very emotional. Yet whatever his actual makeup consisted of he did have his hands full when³⁵ elected governor.

While lacking formal education, Villa was not a simple man. He commanded and supplied a large army while administering civilian matters within Chihuahua. He had no agrarian policy but was familiar with the United State's system of giving Civil War Veterans land. He wished to do the same for his followers. Villa did confiscate the lands of the Terrazas' and their hangers-on but only to stop the oligarchy from launching a counter-revolution. The confiscations had the short term effect of producing operating funds and in the long run it held out the promise of land for the peasants. Unemployment in Chihuahua was minimal largely because the army supplied a large number of jobs. But Villa also ordered a cut in the price of meat and even ran a state operated butcher shop. Only when he ran short on funds did he print his own money, but as long as he was victorious on the battlefield, the money retained its

value. The civilian workings of government ran fairly smoothly during Villa's administration.

Villa's supremacy within Chihuahua also carried over into Federal functions. This brought him into conflict with Venustiano Carranza, First Chief of the Constitutionalist forces. Carranza believed that his was a legal government and that all matters of a federal nature fell within his jurisdiction. In December 1913, the El Paso Herald reported that Carranza would move his headquarters to Juárez or Chihuahua. He had moved it to Hermosillo, Sonora, in August 1913, because of rebel losses in Coahuila. The First Chief, however, decided against the move because the trip would take months unless he went through the United States, and he refused to leave Mexico. Both leaders still saw Huerta as the primary enemy. Villa's victories on the battlefield also forced Carranza to tolerate the former bandit. Yet events slowly moved to a point where the two men came to hate each other. In 1913, however, Federal rumors of a split between Villa and Carranza were premature.

Victoriano Huerta came to power in Mexico through a typical Latin American style coup. Yet in the process he created a martyr in Madero. Opposition to his regime started almost immediately. In the north men like Alvaro Obregón, Venustiano Carranza, and Francisco Villa took up arms against the new president. Victories came slowly for the rebels, but as 1913 came to an end, Villa began to steamroll

south from Chihuahua. A further setback to the new regime came from north of the border in the form of President Woodrow Wilson. His policy of "Watchful Waiting," passive in 1913, became more aggressive in 1914. Tension between Villa and Carranza, while still mild in 1913, was threatening to become worse. In 1914 a bloody split between the two men plunged Mexico into a bitter civil war.

CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES

1. United States Department of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, Department of Justice to Secretary of State, File 812.00lm26/7, January 11, 1913, and Ambassador to Mexico to Secretary of State, File 812.00/6068, February 4, 1913, National Archives, Washington D. C. (Hereafter cited as RDS, RG 59, NA.) Michael Meyer. Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution 1910-1915, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1967, p. 92. (Hereafter cited as, Meyer. Orozco.) Larry Hill. Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's Executive Agents in Mexico, Baton Rouge, Louisiana University Press, 1973, p. 7. (Hereafter cited as, Hill. Emissaries.) William Beezley. Insurgent Governor: Abraham González and the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1973, pps. 154-155. (Hereafter cited as, Beezley. Insurgent Governor.)
2. RDS, Edwin Emerson to Secretary of State, File 812.00/7929, June 21, 1913, Consul at Nuevo Laredo to Secretary of State, File 812.00/6054, undated, received February 9, 1913, Ambassador to Mexico to Secretary of State, File 812.00/6056, February 9, 1913, and Ambassador to Mexico to Secretary of State, File 812.00/6057, February 9, 1913, RG 59, NA. Celia Herrera. Francisco Villa ante la Historia, Cuarto Edición, México D. F., Costa Amic Editores S. A., 1981, p. 59. (Hereafter cited as, Herrera. Villa ante la Historia.) John Womack. Zapata and the Mexican Revolution, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969, p. 159. (Hereafter cited as, Womack. Zapata.) Peter Henderson, Félix Díaz, the Porfirians, and the Mexican Revolution, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1981, p. 73. (Hereafter cited as, Henderson. Félix Díaz.)
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4. RDS, Secretary of State to Ambassador to Mexico, File 812.00/6058, February 10, 1913, and Ambassador to Mexico to Secretary of State, File 812.00/6058,

- February 19, 1913, RG 59, NA. Hill. Emissaries, p. 11. Henderson. Félix Díaz, pps. 78-79.
5. RDS, Ambassador to Mexico to Secretary of State, File 812.00/6288, February 20, 1913, RG 59, NA.
 6. Stanley Ross. Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy, New York, Columbia University Press, 1955, pps. 310-311, 316-317, 319. (Hereafter cited as, Ross. Madero.) Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years, p. 15. RDS, Division of Latin American Affairs to Secretary of State, File 812.00/8066, July 14, 1913, RG 59, NA. Henderson. Félix Díaz, p. 80.
 7. RDS, Translation of Boletín Militar, File 812.00lm26/9, September 2, 1914, RG 59, NA. El Paso Herald, August 1, 1914, p. 8-b.
 8. RDS, Ambassador to Mexico to Secretary of State, File 812.00/6321, February 23, 1913, and Translation of Boletín Militar, File 812.00lm26/9, September 2, 1914, RG 59, NA. Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years, pps. 12-13.
 9. Pascual Orozco, Sr. went to Morelos in March of 1913, to see if he could get Zapata to recognize Huerta because the Plan de Ayala recognized his son as the true leader of the revolution. Zapata refused, arrested Orozco, Sr. in April and some time thereafter had him executed. See, Meyer. Orozco, pps. 100-102. Womack. Zapata, p. 162. Henderson. Félix Díaz, p. 90.
 10. Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years pps. 15-17, 32-33. Meyer. Orozco, pps. 98-100. James Magner. Men of Mexico, New York, Books for Libraries Press, 1968, p. 491. (Hereafter cited as, Magner. Men of Mexico.)
 11. The El Paso Times of June 2, 1914, adds that Maytorena's resignation may have been a result of pressure from the legislature due to financial irregularities attributed to the governor.
 12. RDS, Maytorena to Secretary of State, File 812.00/6553, March 7, 1913, RG 59, NA. Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years, pps. 23-26. George Wolfskill and Douglas Richmond-Editors. Essays on the Mexican Revolution; Revisionist Views of the Leaders, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1979, p. 83. (Hereafter cited as, Richmond and Wolfskill. Revisionist Views.) Martín Luis Guzmán. Memorias de Pancho Villa, México, D. F., CIA., General de Ediciones, 1951. United States

Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, Washington D. C., Government Printing Office, 1920, Maytorena to Secretary of State, File 812.00/8479, August 20, 1913, p. 820. (Hereafter cited as, Foreign Relations.)

13. RDS, Consul to Chihuahua to Secretary of State, File 812.00/9484, October 17, 1913, RG 59, NA. Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years, p. 26. Periódico Oficial del Gobierno Constitucionalista del Estado de Chihuahua, Secretaría del Gobierno Estado de Chihuahua, Encargado: Lic. Armando Almeida Martínez, 1914, pps. 2-3. Francisco Almada, "Don Abraham González", Boletín de la Sociedad Chihuahuense de Estudios Históricos, Tomo 11, Numero 4, Junio-Julio-Agosto de 1964, p. 5. Beezley. Insurgent Governor, pps. 156-158.
14. RDS, Consul at Durango to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11706, April 13, 1914, RG 59, NA.
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16. Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years, pps. 26-29. John Reed. Insurgent Mexico, New York, D. Appleton and Co., 1914, p. 127. (Hereafter cited as, Reed. Insurgent Mexico.) Silvestre Terrazas, "El Verdadero Pancho Villa", Capítlo 13, Boletín de la Sociedad Chihuahuense de Estudios Históricos, Numero 9, 20 de Marzo de 1946, p. 377.
17. Magner. Men of Mexico, p. 491.
18. Reed. Insurgent Mexico, p. 211. Ross. Madero, pps. 76, 129, 231, 278.
19. RDS Consul at Saltillo to Secretary of State, File 812.00/6286, February 20, 1913 and Consul at Eagle Pass to Secretary of State, File 812.00/6341, February 24, 1913, RG 59, NA. Vida Nueva, April 21, 1914, p. 3, gives the date of Carranza's decision as February 19, while Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years, pps. 16-22, gives it as February 21, but Carranza did not proclaim the Plan de Guadalupe until March 26!
20. RDS, Consul at Saltillo to Secretary of State, File 812.00/12462, July 2, 1914, RG 59, NA.

21. Reed. Insurgent Mexico, pps. 218-220. Richmond and Wolfskill. Revisionist Views, p. 49-50, 54. Edith O'Shaughnessy. A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico, New York, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1916, pps. 19-20. (Hereafter cited as, O'Shaughnessy. Diplomat's Wife.) Robert Quirk. The Mexican Revolution and the Catholic Church 1910-1929, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973, pps. 24, 43. (Hereafter cited as, Quirk. Catholic Church.) Gral. Felipe Angeles, "Errores de Revolucionarios y Habilidades de Déspota", Boletín de la Sociedad Chihuahuense de Estudios Históricos, Tomo 4, Noviembre 20 de 1942, p. 220.
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26. Gilderhus. Diplomacy and Revolution, p. 6. Hill. Emissaries, pps. 4-5. The Nation, Volume 98, April 9, 1914, pps. 390-391. Samuel Blythe, "A Conversation with President Wilson", pps. 3-4, 71.
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 30. Gilderhus. Diplomacy and Revolution, pps. 7-8. RDS, Consul at Chihuahua to Secretary of State, File 812.00/8220, July 29, 1913, RG 59, NA. Reed. Insurgent Mexico, p. 95. Meyer. Orozco, pps. 104-105.
 31. Atkin. Revolution!, pps. 160-161. Meyer. Orozco, pps. 104-105.
 32. Atkin. Revolution!, pps. 163-164, 168. Meyer. Orozco, pps. 104-105.
 33. Richmond and Wolfskill. Revisionist Views, p, 41.
 34. Linda Hall. Alvaro Obregón: Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911-1920, College Station, Texas A and M University Press, p. 64.
 35. Richmond and Wolfskill. Revisionist Views, pps. 34-35. Periódico Oficial del Gobierno Constitucionalista del Estado de Chihuahua, Secretaría Estado de Chihuahua, Encaggo: Lic. Armando Almeida Martínez, 1914, pps. 2-3. Hill. Emissaries, p. 234.
 36. Quirk. Catholic Church, pps. 42-43. Gilderhus. Diplomacy and Revolution, pps. 12-13. El Paso Herald, July 21, 1914, p. 1. Richmond and Wolfskill. Revisionist Views, pps. 35-37, 57.
 37. RDS, Cobb to Secretary of State, File 812.00/13128, September 5, 1914, RG 59, NA. El Paso Herald, December 6, 1913, pps. 1-2. O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, p. 84. Hill, Emissaries, pps. 167-168.

CHAPTER THREE

Murder in Juárez

"You have made a mistake in addressing representations in the Benton case to General Villa. They should be addressed to me as First Chief of the revolution and head of the Provisional Constitutionalist Government," said Venustiano Carranza on February 26, 1914 in response to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan's request to send a medical commission to Chihuahua to examine the corpse of the murdered British citizen William S. Benton.¹ Secretary Bryan decided not to put much credence on this stand by the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Forces and went ahead with the planned commission. Francisco Villa, to whom many had assigned guilt in the murder, had invited the United States to form the commission to establish the actual cause of Benton's death. This difference in opinion between the leader of the anti-Huerta coalition and his most successful general became the first in a series of events that led to a split in the revolutionary ranks.²

In the development of the split between Venustiano Carranza and Francisco Villa, the first noticeable signs appeared in each man's dealings with foreign citizens. Carranza believed that as First Chief, he alone should decide the attitude the revolutionaries took towards foreign

governments. Yet he found himself taking a secondary position to Villa. Because of Villa's supremacy within the state of Chihuahua, he had taken it upon himself to deal with foreigners in disputes that had local origins. Thus, two separate foreign policies, often conflicting, emanated from Mexico. Villa vented his rage on Spanish citizens living in Mexico, because he believed they aided Huerta. Carranza publically supported Villa but privately undertook measures that undermined Villa's actions. The international controversy surrounding the death of William S. Benton in Chihuahua again underscored the different attitudes each man had in foreign policy. In order to court support from the United States, Villa was willing to bend over backwards to fulfill that country's wishes, while Carranza refused to allow the United States any special position within Mexico. Thus the first sign of animosity between Carranza and Villa came over foreign affairs in general and the Benton case in particular.

The confiscation of Benton's ranch by the Mexican Revolutionary leader Francisco "Pancho" Villa tormented the Englishman. He had lived prosperously in Mexico for over twenty years. Now he had nothing. He decided to confront Villa and salvage what he could. On the morning of February 17, 1914 he crossed the international border from El Paso, Texas to Ciudad Juárez, Mexico intending to demand that Villa allow him to bring his cattle out of the country. On

his way to Villa's Juárez home and headquarters, he met Gustav Bauch, an American railroad engineer of German parents. Bauch also planned to see Villa in order to vent concerns of his own. When the two men arrived at Villa's office, the soldier guarding the door entered to announce them. Benton, a slender, muscular man of forty-five, with a military bearing and carrying a gun, pushed his way past the guard and immediately began complaining to Villa about the confiscation of his ranch. Bauch, caught off guard by Benton's sudden action, remained in the hall.³

Benton's ranch, Los Remedios near Santa Rosalía, Chihuahua, amounted to some 100,000 acres. The land alone carried a value of 250,000 dollars. Benton, known as a hot-headed, impulsive Scotsman, thought that as a foreigner in Mexico his property should remain exempt from any privations imposed by the revolutionaries. Villa charged that during the porfiriato (1876-1911) Benton had committed many crimes against the people of Mexico and had ordered Los Remedios confiscated. The discussion quickly turned into an argument with both men throwing ugly Spanish epithets back and forth. Finally Benton called Villa a cattle thief and the leader of a band of outlaws and desperados. Villa replied: "So you dare to tell me that I am a thief? A cattle rustler?" Villa, infamous for his sudden and violent temper, flew into a rage. He told Benton that he had no rights in Mexico and that his welcome in the country had

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ended.

What happened next remains debatable. Two conflicting versions have Benton pushed beyond endurance by Villa's outburst and grabbing for his gun. At this point the stories diverge. The first went: Unknown to Benton, hidden behind a curtain lurked Rodolfo Fierro, Villa's personal body guard. When he saw Benton reach for his gun he rushed from his hiding place and plunged a knife into Benton's back, killing the enraged Scotsman. The conflicting version has Villa disarming Benton when the latter reached for his gun. Villa then ordered Fierro to take Benton to Samalayuca and execute the Scotsman by firing squad. Once in the sand hills surrounding the small village that made up that train stop on the Mexican Central Railroad, Fierro had the firing squad dig a grave. Benton requested that the grave be dug deeply in order to keep the coyotes from chewing up his body. Fierro consented and when the condemned Scotsman moved closer to inspect the proceedings, Fierro shot him in the head. In either case Benton's death caused an international incident.⁶

The whole incident occurred before witnesses and took no longer than ten minutes. Those present included two of Villa's men, Gabino Vizcarra, head of the Constitutionalist Financial agency in El Paso, Andrés Frías, an employee of the same agency, a woman, and her daughter. Almost instantly, Villa knew that he had to manufacture a cover-up

to protect his comrade. He also realized that witnesses proved troublesome. He trusted his men. He shipped the woman and her daughter to the interior of Mexico. This left only Gustav Bauch waiting in the hall.⁷

With Benton either dead or unconscious, Villa and his men planned their course of action, and the sudden silence made Bauch suspicious. When Benton did not come out of the room, Bauch asked the guard what had become of his companion. The guard went into the office and soon thereafter Fierro came out and told Bauch that Benton was not there. Fierro then arrested Bauch in order to suppress the true story. Reportedly, that night Villa blocked off the streets near his home and burned Benton's body. The streets remained closed for many days to keep anyone from smelling the lingering, putrid odor of burnt flesh. Though Villa no longer had to worry about Benton's body, Bauch still remained a problem.⁸

The next day rumors of Benton's disappearance began to circulate around El Paso. The United States Consul to Ciudad Juárez, Thomas Edwards, told a reporter that he had heard nothing about Benton, but did have news of an American arrested by the rebels. Edwards visited Gustav Bauch in jail earlier that day. He did not speak to Bauch because the Constitutionals held him incommunicado. The Chief of the Rebel Secret Service explained to the Consul that this followed common procedure. He added that Bauch's arrest

stemmed from finding Federal papers on him that proved him a huertista spy. He claimed that the arrest had taken place on the fifteenth. Yet Edwards could not find any⁹ Constitutionalist official to explain the charges.

On the nineteenth Mrs. Benton, herself a Mexican citizen, and several influential friends asked George Carothers, one of President Wilson's special agents to Mexico, to inquire into the circumstances of Benton's arrest. Carothers went to Villa and asked him about the charges against Benton. Villa affirmed Benton's arrest and assured Carothers of the prisoner's safety. He stated that Benton had pulled a gun on him and that he would be tried by a court-martial. Carothers told Villa that if a fair trial with the necessary documents found Benton guilty then he could remain confident with any verdict. Carothers returned to El Paso and informed Mrs. Benton of his findings. In response to an order from Secretary of State Bryan seeking information on Benton, Carothers telegraphed the Secretary his report of Benton's incarceration. The State Department released Carothers' findings to the press and the matter¹⁰ seemed about to conclude quietly.

Yet the Benton affair was to cause greater problems than Villa imagined. When Carothers left, Villa suddenly realized that he would have to manufacture official papers for Benton's death. He also realized that Bauch could expose him. As he pondered what to do with Bauch, he set

his advisors to work concocting the court-martial. He decided to leave for Chihuahua the next day, telling the press only that he had to prepare for his army's advance on Torreón. At the same time he saw the chance to put some distance between himself and the center of the dispute. A slight hitch developed in the preparation of a posthumous case against Benton when the villistas could not find a copy of Benton's signature. They decided to resolve this difficulty the next day by going to Santa Rosalía, outside of Chihuahua on the Kansas City, Mexico and Orient Railroad, where they could obtain a copy of Benton's original complaint about stolen cattle. Next the villistas needed to execute Benton officially. But Benton's death complicated the matter. They solved this problem and the problem of Bauch in one motion. Along the way to Chihuahua the villistas would execute Bauch in Benton's place. With his course set, Villa prepared for his exodus from Juárez.¹¹

The first report of Benton's disappearance appeared in The New York Times on February 19, 1914. The report stated that Benton's arrest resulted from his alleged association with a filibuster movement that attempted to cross into Mexico on the seventeenth. When pressed by a reporter, Villa admitted that Benton was in his custody. He added, "What would you think of a man who came to see me and threatened me with a big six-shooter?"¹² One of his followers said that he should be shot. Villa disclosed that

the gun was in his possession. This report did not acknowledge the death of Benton, but the Scotsman's disappearance concerned his Mexican wife.¹³

On the nineteenth of February the British Foreign Office, still believing Benton alive, set in motion an attempt to save his life. Mrs. Benton initiated this effort when she cabled the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, to find out what had happened to her husband. Spring-Rice contacted Secretary of State Bryan, who in turn, instructed the American Consul at Juárez, Thomas Edwards, and Special Agent George Carothers to look into the matter. Edwards met with Villa some time after the latter had met with Carothers. Villa told Edwards that Benton came to his home to kill him. He showed the consul the gun. Villa then claimed that Benton died on the seventeenth at the hands of a firing squad. Edwards returned to El Paso and wired his findings to the State Department. But the Department decided not to give the press this new information. Relying on Carothers' report, The New York Times reported on the twentieth that, although in jail, Benton was still alive. Yet the El Paso Herald reported that Mrs. Benton, while hopeful, believed that her husband was dead. On the twenty-first The New York Times reported Villa saying: "He [Benton] died the night of the same day."¹⁴

This revelation put the American government in a

difficult position. To the world it looked like the United States had tried to help cover-up Benton's death. Villa now admitted that when he told Carothers that Benton was in jail, he had already been executed. The State Department's refusal to release the information that it received from Consul Edwards cast a bad light on the United States. Upon request of the Department, Villa agreed to mark the grave so that it could be relocated. Moreover, reported Villa, the location of the American Bauch was now unknown. He professed that he believed the latter had escaped and would show up shortly. Yet Benton's British citizenship complicated the matter.¹⁵

The American Ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines Page, summed up the British attitude: "Kill an Englishman at home and there is no undue excitement. But kill one abroad, and gun-boats and armies and reparation are at once thought about - a state of mind that English rule in India & [sic] in other far-off foreign lands has made necessary till it has become instinctive."¹⁶ The official view of the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, agreed with Secretary Bryan: if proof of Benton's military execution was forthcoming, then the British could only object to the speed in which it was carried out. Many British journals reported that Great Britain would discontinue supporting Wilson's policy of "Watchful Waiting." British public opinion, reported the London Sunday Times, held that the United

States must uphold the Monroe Doctrine and that the obligation was greater in this instance because the United States tacitly supported the faction that committed the crime. Commenting on the case before Parliament, Grey said:

I should like to add that the fact that we are communicating with the United States does not, of course, imply that they have any responsibility for what has taken place; the communications have been made because the United States alone can, in this instance, exercise any influence to discover the truth and to get justice done.¹⁷

Grey added that he would stay in touch with the British Ambassador to the United States to see what further steps
18
the United States would take.

Yet the British press did not allow the matter to subside. The protection of English citizens abroad became the major topic in British newspapers. As Edith O'Shaughnessy, wife of the United States Charge d'Affaires in Mexico City, put it: "A life is worth a life, perhaps, before God; but down here the murder of a wealthy British subject is of more account than that of some poor American
19
or a thousand Mexicans."

The London Daily Mail editorialized: "How long, may we ask, does the President of the United States propose to allow Mexico to flounder in her
20
present morass of anarchy." The London Times reported that Benton's death showed Villa as nothing more than a
21
hot-tempered bandit.

On the nineteenth of February, when Villa first told

Consul Edwards of Benton's death, the Consul requested that the remains be released to Mrs. Benton for proper burial. Villa refused to give up the body, even at the risk of offending the United States. Because most of his munitions came from north of the border, Villa realized that the United States held the key to a successful conclusion to the revolution. He knew that the United States wanted to examine the body to try to establish the actual method of death. Yet he could not risk an autopsy because it would²² prove that Benton did not die in the way he claimed.

Villa left for Chihuahua on the twentieth with Gustav Bauch and all those on his staff with any knowledge of the Benton case. The rebels reported that the German-American would stand trial in Chihuahua as a huertista spy. Edwards believed that Bauch did not go south with Villa, but when friends went to see the alleged spy in the Juárez jail, he was not there. One of the prisoners that went south with Villa, Reyes Chávez, claimed upon his release that the train²³ stopped at Samalayuca and there Bauch was executed.

On the twenty-third of February Mrs. Benton cabled the British Ambassador and requested his assistance in obtaining the remains of her husband. Secretary Bryan, responding to the request from Spring-Rice, instructed George Carothers to ask Villa to release Benton's body to the British Government. Villa refused. Carothers then told Villa that if he would allow an independent medical team to examine

Benton's corpse then they could establish the actual cause of death. Villa agreed to take the recommendation under consideration. His refusal to give up the body stemmed from the fact that he could no longer deliver it. Yet he incorrectly believed that if he waited long enough, he could deliver Bauch's body instead, thinking decay would make identification impossible. On February twenty-sixth he proposed that the United States send a team of doctors to Chihuahua to examine the body. The United States agreed and put together a medical team that included James Hambleton, a British doctor, and Charles Perceval, British Consul to Galveston, Texas. On May first the team prepared to board a special train provided by Villa for the trip to Chihuahua.²⁴

At this point the whole affair changed from Villa's problem to Carranza's. Bryan cabled Carranza on the twenty-sixth and told the Constitutionalist leader of his intention of sending a medical commission to Chihuahua. Carranza responded that this was the first time that the incident had been relayed through the proper diplomatic channels, and for that reason he felt no prior need to comment on the issue. He informed the United States government that, as head of the Constitutionalist movement, any diplomatic matters should be brought to his attention and not to one of his field commanders, implying that the commission did not have his acceptance. But the State Department did not put much credence on this position and

went ahead with the planned commission. When the medical team arrived in Juárez on the first of March, Carranza's agents ordered them back to El Paso.

Previously Carranza had allowed Villa to make his own mistakes in dealing with foreign governments. Villa's attitude toward the Spanish constituted the best example. Villa believed that the Spanish assisted the huertista forces and that made them his enemies. The Spaniards in Chihuahua had millions of dollars of property and were the primary owners of mercantile establishments and pawn shops. When Villa entered Ciudad Chihuahua in December 1913, he gave all Spanish citizens five days to leave Mexico with the penalty of death to those that did not comply. On 8 December he extended the time limit to ten days because of the great number of Spanish in Chihuahua. The Spanish in that city were some of the wealthiest in the country, and Villa ordered them all to leave without their property.

On the thirteenth of December nearly five hundred Spanish citizens arrived in El Paso, Texas, from Chihuahua in a special train provided by Villa. On the seventeenth of December a second train with more than five hundred Spanish and American citizens left Chihuahua. Villa forced many of the wealthy Spaniards to pay a ransom in order to leave the country. He took the Luis Siqueiros family from the train and forced them to pay 5,000 dollars before being allowed back on the train. The Spanish in Monterrey also prepared

to leave northern Mexico in fear of that city's fall to the
27
rebels.

On February 3, 1914, Villa issued a warning that all Spanish in Torreón would be dealt with immediately following the capture of that city. If he found proof that they aided the Federal forces the result would be death; otherwise they would be banished. He believed that all the Spaniards in Torreón were armed and in that case, if captured, they would be shot. Villa divided all foreigners into three classes. The first were United States citizens who had no restrictions on their business activities in villista-held territory. The second group included all other foreigners except the Spanish. This group was forced to pay to do business in Chihuahua. The Spanish constituted the third group. Villa considered Spanish property booty of war and
28
used it for his own purposes.

Villa confiscated three wholesale warehouses owned by the Spaniards Manuel and Domingo Trueba and E. Canalles in Juárez. This gave him thousands of dollars of stock, groceries, and clothing. When he seized the store El Nuevo Mundo from Spanish owners he sold its stock of shoes at half their listed price and sugar that brought thirty-five cents was let go for twenty. Following the capture of Torreón in April 1914, Villa shipped 407 railroad cars of cotton from the Laguna district. Aside from 12 carloads of United States and British cotton the rest was confiscated Spanish

cotton. Spanish refugees held some of it up, but the majority was ready for resale at forty dollars a bale or a total in excess of 800,000 dollars. While the United States government tried to bring pressure against Villa to relax his attitude towards the Spanish, Villa continued to be uncompromising. His position was reinforced by Carranza.²⁹

Carranza believed that the report of Spanish mistreatment was overblown. He argued that Villa only expelled those Spaniard merchants and priests that actively supported Huerta. He reported that the action was authorized by the re-instatement of the January 25, 1862 decree, which allowed the execution of any citizen of Mexico that aided Huerta. Yet privately Carranza worked to undermine Villa's position with regard to the Spaniards. He began to grant citizenship to those Spaniards requesting it and allowed them to return to Mexico and guaranteed their property rights. Villa's actions towards the Spanish forced Carranza into a position that he may not have taken. Again in the Benton Affair, Villa's actions forced Carranza to settle another diplomatic dispute. With the success of the revolution and Villa's constant difficulties with other governments, Carranza was forced to attempt to control the leader of the Northern Division.³⁰

On the twenty-seventh of February 1914, when Villa informed Carranza that he had invited a medical team to examine Benton's body, Carranza ordered that he discontinue

any discussions with the United States. Villa readily agreed. Carranza also saw a chance to pressure Britain into withdrawing its de facto recognition of the Huerta government. Moreover Carranza denied the United States the right to concern itself with a matter dealing with a citizen from another country. He argued that only the home country through its official representatives could conduct negotiations. When a reporter asked Carranza if he recognized the United States as champion of all foreigners in Mexico, the First Chief refused to answer. He made it clear that if the British wanted to inquire into the Benton³¹ incident, then they should do it through proper channels.

That such channels did not exist overtly pointed to Carranza's diplomatic maneuvering. Carranza took this position for three reasons. First, he hoped to force Great Britain into de facto recognition of his government. Second, he could not afford to appear like an American puppet to his people. Third, he wanted to avoid any Mexican recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, which he believed implied a loss of sovereignty. He announced that he would appoint a commission to investigate the death and agreed to make its findings known to the United States. Because Great Britain supported Huerta, and Carranza refused to allow the United States to intervene in the matter, technically no one could make a claim for Benton's body. But if the British recognized the belligerency of the Constitutionalists and

appointed representatives to rebel controlled territory, then they could request the body officially. This forced the decision on Sir Edward Grey and the British.³²

Sir Edward Grey told Parliament that they would have to move slowly because premature recognition of the rebels would present problems if Huerta quelled the rebellion. He added that while the Constitutionalists refused to allow the United States to intervene, he felt that Secretary Bryan and President Wilson had shown enough interest in the case to continue backing the President's policies. Wilson informed the press that he would continue his policy of "Watchful Waiting." The occurrence of the incident so soon after the repeal of the arms embargo (February 3, 1914) was unfortunate but the President would not allow it to change his course. The incident did have a decisive effect on the rebellion though, because it forced Carranza to assert his authority as diplomatic head of the Constitutionalists. Yet it did not turn Wilson away from his unofficial backing of the Constitutionalists.³³

Yielding to pressure from the United States and his own advisors, Carranza made it known on March 11, 1914 that future cases of claims by other countries on behalf of their citizens could be handled by the United States. If another country wanted the United States to intervene on the behalf of one of its citizens then written notice through the proper channels must precede any action by the United

States. Villa added that any matter Carranza refused to act upon in Chihuahua could be brought to him and he would see if he could clear it up. Thus almost immediately after Carranza had saved Villa's hide by settling the Benton Affair, Villa had again taken the lead in relations with foreign governments within territory he controlled. Carranza decided the time had come to move his government to Chihuahua and attempt to control his most successful general. The fact that the revolution had achieved such rapid advances also threatened to strand the First Chief in the north. His refusal to leave Mexico to make the quick trip through the United States from Nogales, Arizona to El Paso, Texas stemmed from his fear that if he left Mexico someone would usurp his position. Two other men also moved to become closer to Villa, Special Agent George Carothers³⁴ and General Felipe Angeles.

George Carothers was born in 1875 and at the age of 14 immigrated to Saltillo, Coahuila, with his family. He became Consular agent to Torreón in 1902, but was a heavy gambler, which kept him constantly in debt and in trouble with the State Department. Only his performance during the Orozco rebellion, protecting United States citizens and property, saved him from being dismissed. On December 9, 1913 he received orders to go to Chihuahua and establish good relations with Villa. His first act as the President's Special agent was to temper Villa's attitude towards the

Spanish. He succeeded only in convincing Villa that any Spaniard who could prove he did not support Huerta could³⁵ return to Mexico and retake possession of their property.

On the twenty-fifth of February 1914, Carothers received orders to remain with Villa. He informed the State Department that he thought it better to get permission from Carranza before taking up the position. Carranza agreed to Carothers' request and gave the new agent a Constitutionalist code book. Yet Carothers' presence displeased the established Consul in Chihuahua, Marion Letcher. Letcher's attitude became so antagonistic that Carothers convinced Bryan to order Letcher to cooperate with the Executive Agent in any way possible. Carothers gave Washington direct access to Mexico's most successful general and the two men established a good rapport. Carothers' main duty was to inform the State Department of any important³⁶ differences that occurred between Villa and Carranza.

Yet as the revolution progressed, Carothers began to receive substantial amounts of criticism for his handling of Villa. His closeness to Villa brought charges of being a villista partisan from House and Senate Republicans. Carranza also became dissatisfied with the Carothers-Villa friendship. He viewed it as near recognition of Villa's position as the leader of the Constitutionalist forces. Carranza charged that Villa's insubordination over the Zacatecas campaign in June of 1914, was caused by Carothers'

promises of support from Washington. Whatever Carothers' actual role in promoting Villa to Washington, in the long run his presence added to the friction between the First Chief and Villa.³⁷

General Felipe Angeles also joined Villa in February of 1914. A Federal artillery officer prior to the Madero revolution, Angeles was the sub-secretary of War in Carranza's cabinet. He was one of the few generals to support Madero actively during the Tragic Ten days and was arrested with Madero on February 19, 1913. Angeles was under the command of Victoriano Huerta during the fighting in Mexico City but did not support the new president and accepted a military study mission to Europe. While in Paris he wrote Carranza and offered his services to the Constitutionalist cause. When Villa requested that the sub-Secretary join his army as commander of artillery, Carranza consented and Angeles joined Villa prior to the Torreón campaign.³⁸

Angeles, like Carothers, became an avid Villa partisan and the General of the División del Norte and the former Artillery officer formed a good team. Angeles, too, would add to the friction developing between Villa and Carranza. Again the problem resulted over Villa's conduct in the Zacatecas campaign. Carranza charged that Villa's insubordination was the result of Angeles' prodding. Carranza then branded Angeles a member of the reaction,

implying that Villa was also a part of the reaction. Angeles sent Carranza an explanation in August of 1914, explaining why Villa had disobeyed Carranza's order during the Zacatecas campaign. It read like a school master explaining a simple concept to an unruly child. Yet Zacatecas was still yet to come, first Villa and Carranza had to meet in Chihuahua for the first time since the Madero³⁹ rebellion.

International relations concerning the Constitutionalist forces became the first in a series of instances that lead to the split between Venustiano Carranza and Francisco Villa. In Villa's dealings with both the Spanish and Benton, Carranza was forced to backup Villa. While he was willing to do it because of Villa's military successes, he also realized that he needed to try to control Villa's outrages. This forced him to move his headquarters from Hermosillo to Chihuahua. This attempt by Carranza ultimately failed to bring Villa under control or to establish an understanding between the two men. Villa's dealings with the Spanish and Benton also brought George Carothers into Villa's camp and added friction between the latter and Carranza. General Felipe Angeles also joined Villa following the Benton affair, and he too added friction between Villa and Carranza. First, however, the two revolutionaries would meet in Chihuahua and further drive a wedge between them.

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER FOUR

"Chocolateros Perfumados"

"This violation of the national sovereignty" wrote Venustiano Carranza to President Woodrow Wilson in April 1914, in response to the United States occupation of the Mexican port of Veracruz was ". . . highly offensive to the dignity and independence of Mexico" and should be terminated at once.¹ He added that acts committed by General Victoriano Huerta, usurper of the Mexican executive office, did not represent Mexico. He warned Wilson that the invasion of Veracruz could lead to an unequal war between the United States and Mexico. The best possible result was the immediate withdrawal of the United States forces. Wilson's first and only divergence from his enunciated policy of "watchful waiting" had taken an unexpected turn. The leader of the Constitutionalist revolt reproached an action that began in order to assist the rebels. Yet Wilson did have one Mexican supporter, Pancho Villa. Villa said of the affair at Veracruz: "Honest, I hope the Americans bottle up² Veracruz so tight they can't (sic) even get water into it." Another event in the Mexican Revolution intensified the friction between Villa and Carranza.³

A few weeks before the United States moved into Veracruz, Villa and Carranza met in Chihuahua for the first

time since the Madero revolt. This meeting did more to drive a wedge between the two men than it did to create a unified front. Personality differences now came sharply to the fore at this meeting. Then came the occupation of Veracruz. The different attitude each man took toward the invasion heightened the festering discontent that their positions vis-a-vis foreign governments had generated. As with the former cases, Villa's attitude prevailed and forced Carranza to take a secondary position. Yet not only international events contributed to the discontent between the two men at this juncture of the revolution. A disagreement regarding Villa's role in Chihuahua occurred during Carranza's stay in Ciudad Chihuahua. The resolution of the issue again involved Carranza backing down to Villa but brought about a new policy by the First Chief toward his very successful general. After May 1914, Carranza would do all that he could to contain Villa in the north and let his other generals lead the Constitutionalist armies to the City of Mexico and a successful conclusion of the revolution.

Carranza's decision to move the Constitutionalist government from Hermosillo, Sonora, to the state of Chihuahua had a variety of sources. The Benton Affair in February 1914, showed Carranza the necessity of moving to Chihuahua to attempt to control Villa's excesses. Villa also invited Carranza to move the government there because of a disagreement Villa had with Manuel Chao, the civilian

governor appointed by Carranza.

But the most important reason for Carranza's move to Chihuahua had to do with logistics. The rapid advance of the Constitutionalist armies threatened to strand Carranza in the north. The main transportation artery, the Mexican Central Railroad, built during the porfiriato, ran from Ciudad Juárez, through Chihuahua City, Torreón, Zacatecas, and on to Mexico City. Huerta realized the importance of this iron highway and garrisoned the major cities with the bulk of his forces. Villa's victories along the route of the Mexican Central in early 1914, showed Carranza that unless he moved, Villa could arrive at the capital before him. Carranza first moved north to avoid traveling through the worst of the mountains. On March 12, 1914, he left Agua Prieta, Sonora, for the two-week horseback ride to Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua.⁵

Carranza arrived in Ciudad Juarez while Villa and his forces battled at San Pedro. A big reception greeted Carranza in Juárez to which Villa replied when hearing of it: "Let him stay up there with his feasts, this is the key to the situation down here."⁶ Special agent George Carothers foresaw many complications in the relationship between Villa and Carranza. Up to this point, wrote Carothers to Secretary of State Bryan, Carranza had failed to assume control of anything. Villa continued to manage events in Chihuahua. He had a separate organization in Juárez, accountable only to

him. This organization purchased all of Villa's munitions and sold all confiscated goods without rendering any accounts to Carranza. Carothers believed that Carranza feared Villa and was prepared to leave him alone. If Carranza took control of the situation Villa would let him, but Villa hated cowards and could, like the feral creature he was, sniff Carranza's discomfiture. All this convinced Carothers that their meeting in Ciudad Chihuahua would lead to nothing positive.⁷

The meeting in Chihuahua between Villa and Carranza began badly. Villa had just returned from the successful campaign against San Pedro and still wore his dusty, dirty clothes. He embraced Carranza in the traditional abrazo, to which Carranza responded rather coldly and stiffly. Villa said after that Carranza never looked him in the eyes during their conversation and that the two men had nothing in common. Carranza treated Villa in a condescending manner making the mistake that Madero and González had avoided. Villa said later: "I thought then that this man will not bring us to a good end: he had already given every thing good in his life that he could give."⁸ Yet Villa did not immediately disavow the First Chief. He acknowledged his allegiance to the Plan de Guadalupe, but called the civilians around Carranza and the First Chief chocolateros perfumados, (perfumed chocolate drinkers), underscoring his attitude towards the urban politicians.⁹ An episode

occurring at the port of Tampico, Mexico, exacerbated this
growing discontent between Villa and Carranza.¹⁰

On the morning of April 9, 1914, the paymaster of the U.S.S. Dolphin and his seven-man crew landed in a restricted area of Tampico harbor to pick up some gas for the boats ferrying supplies to the United States warships in the harbor. The federales restricted the area because of rebel attacks in the area. Unfortunately the paymaster of the Dolphin knew nothing of this. While loading their cargo a squad of Mexican Federal soldiers, following orders, arrested the United States crew. When arrested, two of the Americans were still in the boat. The two in the boat at first refused to leave, but the federales' guns proved persuasive. Unknown to the Mexican Federal officer this action constituted an act of war. This minor incident soon¹¹ began to escalate.

The Mexicans marched the United States soldiers through the streets for about five minutes until they reached a superior officer. This officer immediately became enraged with his subordinate and apologized to the paymaster for the mistaken arrest. This officer then allowed the paymaster to return to the whaleboat and continue loading the gas. Before they finished their task, General Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza, commander of the Federal forces in Tampico, came to the wharf and again apologized. He told the paymaster that an ignorant junior officer committed the error. He

apologized again, and the United States crew returned to the
¹²
Dolphin.

When Admiral Henry Mayo, United States Commander of the Fifth Naval Division stationed at Tampico, heard of the incident, he sent a note to General Zaragoza demanding that the junior officer be severely punished and that the Mexicans render a twenty-one gun salute to the United States flag. Admiral Frank Fletcher, Mayo's counterpart and United States Commander of the Forth Naval Division stationed at Veracruz, agreed that some type of reprisal was necessary for the insult to the flag. President Wilson agreed. Mayo's demand for the salute was for the next day, but Zaragoza told him that he could not make that kind of decision, only the president, Victoriano Huerta, could. On April 13, Huerta told the press that he would not salute the United States¹ flag because " . . . such a step would be highly derogatory to national dignity."¹³ The minor incident at Tampico Harbor had escalated from junior officers to commanding officers to presidents,¹⁴ but it had not ended.

On April 15, Huerta proposed that both sides fire a salute to show good faith. Huerta wanted the United States to fire first because he feared that they would not respond to the salute in an attempt to humiliate him. He had reason for his fear. When a Mexican ship passed through the newly completed Panama Canal, a Mexican salute to the United States flag went unanswered. The whole matter of salutes

was wrapped up in international law. President Wilson wanted to avoid saluting the Mexican flag because that would imply recognition of Huerta's government. Yet just the fact that the United States demanded a salute from a government it did not recognize meant a type of recognition. Wilson avoided this maze by stating that he wanted the salute from Huerta personally, not as the representative of Mexico. For the next six days, the diplomats tried to solve the impasse.¹⁵

United States Charge' d'Affairs to Mexico, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, worked diligently to solve the dispute. He had established a good working relationship with Huerta and on the sixteenth convinced Huerta that a simultaneous salute was the best the Mexican President could expect from the United States government. O'Shaughnessy informed Secretary Bryan of this new development, but the secretary rejected the idea of a simultaneous salute. Bryan wrote: "International practice demands that Huerta fulfill the demands of the United States . . ."¹⁶ He also dispatched a flotilla of ships to Tampico Harbor in order to force Huerta to fire the salute. Bryan wrote O'Shaughnessy that " . . . there would be no further discussion as to the exact method of an exchange of salutes."¹⁷

O'Shaughnessy tried one last approach to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Huerta agreed to salute the United States flag first if the United States promised

to respond, and he wanted a protocol to insure the response. O'Shaughnessy prepared the protocol and sent it to the State Department. Bryan replied that no concessions could be made. Huerta must fire a salute as an apology for the arrest of the sailors. When completed, international law required that the United States respond. A signed protocol would imply recognition but, Bryan told O'Shaughnessy, Huerta could rest assured that the United States would live up to its international requirements. Bryan also instructed O'Shaughnessy to inform Huerta that he had until 6:00 p.m. April 19, to agree to the United States' demands. If Huerta refused, President Wilson would put the matter before Congress. On April 19, at 5:00 p.m., O'Shaughnessy called at the Mexican Foreign Office and was handed a note saying that Mexico could not accept the uncompromising attitude of the United States. The Mexican Foreign Minister considered the matter closed. Diplomacy had failed to settle the matter and the final escalation¹⁸ followed.

On the afternoon of April 20, 1914, President Woodrow Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress. Without asking for a formal declaration, he requested war powers in order to do whatever was necessary to punish Huerta. He advised Congress of the Tampico incident, saying that Huerta's apology was not sufficient and a salute was mandatory. He also cited the arrest of a mail orderly from the U.S.S.

¹⁹
Minnesota as evidence of Huerta's bad faith. The House passed the President's resolution by a vote of 323 to 9, but the Senate postponed the matter until the next day. Before the Senate could decide on the resolution, further developments made the vote moot.²⁰

That evening the United States Consul to Veracruz, William Canada, reported that the Hamburg-American steamer Ypiranga was scheduled to arrive the next morning at the Mexican port of Veracruz with a vast amount of munitions for Huerta.²¹ Three trains of ten cars each were waiting to take the arms to the front. In the early morning hours of April 21, Secretary Bryan telephoned President Wilson and received instructions to prevent the landing of the arms. At 4:00 a.m., Admiral Fletcher received orders to take the customs house at Veracruz and prevent the delivery of the arms. Wilson believed that the landing would be unopposed because one of his special agents, John Lind, informed him that the Mexican people would rejoice at the arrival of the United States' forces.²² Lind was wrong.

Marines and Bluejackets landed at Veracruz on April 21, 1914, and quickly took control of the custom house. The bulk of the Mexican Federal Army reacted by retreating to Tíjeria, five miles west of Veracruz. On the twenty-second general fighting broke out as the United States forces expanded their control from the harbor area. Most of the fighting was confined to rooftop sniping from small groups

of soldiers and civilians, but blood flowed on both sides. The center of resistance was the Mexican Naval Academy, which the big guns of the navy soon quieted. The forces of the United States achieved their control of the city that afternoon, and Admiral Fletcher, in a proclamation, informed the people of Veracruz that the United States intended to remain in control for some time.²³

Ironically, the Ypiranga was not detained in the harbor. It arrived at about noon of the twenty-first, and its captain was told that he was not permitted to leave the harbor. Two days later the captain received orders from the Americans to unload his cargo. The captain refused, and indicated that he would return to Germany. When the Ypiranga left Veracruz it headed for Puerto México, 200 miles south and with Huerta's permission, unloaded its arms. The arms reached Mexico City by the end of May, but too late to be of any use in the north. The pretext for the landing had slipped away.²⁴

Wilson also found another unexpected result. Reports of casualties put 12 Americans dead and 50-60 wounded. While over 150 Mexicans were estimated killed or wounded. Wilson's first words when hearing of the casualties were:²⁵ "I'm sorry, terribly sorry." He appeared to be visibly shaken, sad, and disheartened. On the twenty-first a joint session of Congress resolved that the President was justified in employing the armed forces in his dispute with

Huerta. Yet, the occupation of Veracruz resulted in an unexpected foe and caused problems in the Constitutionalist ranks.²⁶

The occupation of Veracruz by United States forces brought a strong note of protest from Venustiano Carranza, the man the invasion was intended to help. Carranza steadfastly believed that the Constitutionalist government under his command was the only legal government in Mexico and, as a result, the United States had no right to intervene in a dispute with Huerta. In his note to Secretary Bryan, Carranza informed the United States that the Constitutionlists would deal with Huerta when the time came and to evacuate their forces immediately. Carranza warned that the Huerta's acts were not sufficient to involve the two countries in a war, but if the United States did not evacuate, then war was inevitable. Carranza added that if complaints were brought to him, then as the true leader of Mexico, he would settle them. Carranza's note was deadly serious, and the El Paso Herald reported on April 23, that Villa had 15,000 men ready in Juarez to invade El Paso. The²⁷ situation between the two countries was tense.

Villa's position in the matter until April 23, seemed to correspond to Carranza's. Yet this reflected the fact that carrancista supporters censored all of Villa's telegrams from Chihuahua. Villa decided that it was necessary for him to go to the border, Ciudad Juárez, and

let the American people know his true feelings about the occupation. Villa informed George Carothers that he had no problem with the United States occupation of Veracruz as long as they did not expand their control. He said the United States had done what the rebels could not do. His repudiation of Carranza's demand for evacuation of Veracruz eased much of the tension between the two countries. As one journalist in the United States put it: "Nothing Villa has ever done has been so much to his credit as his recent trip to the border to loosen the tension between his people and the Americans, which was reaching the breaking point."²⁸

Villa, in a letter to the Secretary of State, said that Carranza's pride was excusable because it was in the defense of the dignity of Mexico. Carothers told Bryan that Constitutionalist neutrality could be established through Villa. Yet many reports also told of tensions developing²⁹ between Villa and Carranza over their opposite views.

On April 25, 1914, the El Paso Herald reported that Carranza had not backed down from his previous position. In a cablegram to Madrid, Spain, dated from Chihuahua, Carranza reiterated his readiness to go to war with the United States. Villa's direct contradiction of Carranza led the same newspaper to believe that the split between Villa and Carranza was already fact. It added that Villa still claimed to be Carranza's subordinate but discounted the claim. Yet both men already began to move to a compromise

position on the occupation. In response to Wilson's letter to Carranza stating that the United States did not have a quarrel with the Constitutionalists, Villa said: "I am a soldier and not a diplomat and in that capacity it would be improper for me to comment on the matter."³⁰ Villa was backing away from his opposition to Carranza. Roberto Pesqueira, Carranza's confidential agent in Juarez, reported that Carranza's original message to Secretary Bryan did not mean war, but was a friendly note. Carranza too, began to retreat from his uncompromising attitude. On April 27, Villa left Juárez for Chihuahua in order to confer with Carranza.³¹

On April 29, Villa and Carranza met in the Chihuahuan Governor's palace for almost three hours discussing the Veracruz incident and its aftermath. The results of the conference, stated in a telegram to the El Paso Herald, reported that Carranza had changed his mind and was now in complete agreement with Villa. Villa's attitude was seconded by Carranza's advisors, and together they convinced the First Chief to soften his attitude. Villa and Carranza also discounted reports of a split between them, adding that rumors of friction came from their enemies in an attempt to bring discord between the two. Villa also publically reaffirmed his unquestionable loyalty to Carranza. Villa and Carranza had solved their difficulties over their reaction to the occupation, but President Wilson found himself in a

difficult position.

The occupation of Veracruz by the United States caused a very strong undercurrent of resentment towards the United States in Mexico and Latin America. Anti-American demonstrations broke out in Mexico City on the twenty-third with the American flag being thrown to the ground and trampled to chants of "Death to the Yankees."³³ Demonstrations against the United States were also reported in Argentina and Brazil. In Mexico City the demonstrators continued to rally night and day through the twenty-fifth. The Federals successfully recruited all over Mexico under the pretext of war with the United States. That these new troops would fight the Constitutionlists in the longrun seemed too obvious for many. The extreme outrage in Mexico and throughout Latin America caught Wilson off-guard. He expected the troops to be greeted with open arms. He needed³⁴ a face saving way out of the whole sorry business.

On April 26, 1914, Venustiano Carranza received word from the ABC countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), of mediation to take place between Huerta and the United States. The conference originally met to avert war between the United States and Mexico and gave Wilson a way out of the situation. Both Huerta and Wilson agreed to an armistice while the mediators endeavored to settle the two countries' differences. Yet the aims of the conference quickly changed. Instead of working only to avert war

between the United States and Mexico, the mediators wanted to reconstruct Mexico through a temporary government. The Tampico incident ultimately became lost in the shuffle. As the agenda of the conference changed, so, too, did Wilson's aims. Wilson decided that the mediators would meet until they reached a successful settlement provided it was a settlement on his terms. Attempts to bring the Constitutionalists into the conference failed because Carranza refused to allow internal matters into the discussion. Wilson and the mediators demanded that a settlement to the revolution be included in any outcome to the conference. Ultimately the conference failed because of its agenda and the success of the Constitutionalists. Yet the rebels did not remain a united group, and friction between Villa and Carranza continued to mount following the Tampico incident and invasion of Veracruz.³⁵

The political situation in Chihuahua caused added problems between Villa and Carranza. Before the capture of Ciudad Chihuahua in December 1913, Villa intended to appoint Juan Medina as civilian governor. But Carranza sent Jesús Acuña to tell Villa to place Manuel Chao in the top civilian position in Chihuahua. Acuña told Villa that Medina would conspire against him and when Medina did not consult Villa on civil appointments, Villa removed him. Medina responded by fleeing north. After the taking of Chihuahua, Chao, Villa, Maclovio Herrera, and Jose Rodriguez decided to place

Villa in the governor's chair. He held the position for a few weeks and then transferred the position to Chao in compliance with Carranza's orders. Yet all this maneuvering led to a contradictory situation. Villa as military head of Chihuahua was superior to Chao. But in civilian affairs Villa was Chao's subordinate. This led to a problem between Villa and Chao which ultimately involved Carranza. ³⁶

In late April and early May, an internal disruption in the Constitutionalist ranks began to manifest itself in Chihuahua. Villa began to believe that Manuel Chao was running Chihuahua without due respect for his authority. Since Carranza's arrival in Chihuahua, Chao followed Carranza's orders more and more. But when Villa returned from Juárez, he told Chao that the latter governed because he allowed it and not because Carranza ordered it. Carranza also had filled all government offices in Chihuahua with his followers, creating a dual government in that state, one loyal to Carranza, the other to Villa. Villa as Chao's superior officer ordered him to go to Torreón and assume command of one of the División del Norte's brigades. Chao responded that as governor he did not have to take orders from Villa. Villa replied by ordering Chao shot for insubordination. Chao got himself out of the difficulty by reassuring Villa of his loyalty and accepting the appointment at Torreón. They settled the matter between themselves but Carranza decided to intrude into the

matter.

The whole problem resulted from Carranza's attempt to belittle Villa's accomplishments and replace him as military leader of Chihuahua. When Carranza heard of Villa's order to shoot Chao he demanded an explanation. Villa told Carranza that Chao was governing badly and he had taken care of it by appointing General Fidel Avila as military governor of Chihuahua. Carranza's men in Chihuahua were removed from their civilian governmental positions and Villa retained control of Chihuahua. A split had been avoided but, Carranza came to the realization that Villa could no longer be trusted to move south. Carranza feared that Villa would reach Mexico City ahead of more loyal carrancista troops. This desire by Carranza to contain Villa in the north led to the definitive split between him and Villa.³⁸

The timing of Carranza's arrival in Chihuahua just before the United States occupation of Veracruz was decisive for the unity of the Constitutionalist cause. Villa's courtship of the United States and Carranza's extreme and opportunistic nationalism were given an outlet that contradicted each other. Yet as in the Benton case and Villa's dealings with the Spanish, Carranza took a subordinate position to Villa. This repeated flaunting of Carranza's position as First Chief contributed to the decision to contain Villa to northern Mexico. The same can be said for Villa's attitude towards the governing of

Chihuahua. Villa yielded to Carranza in cases that did not dispute his control. But as in the case of Chao, when Villa felt his position threatened, he protected himself, even at the risk of disobeying Carranza. Again events of the revolution had exacerbated personality differences between Villa and Carranza. A conflict in strategy in the campaign south towards Mexico City manifested itself in June and brought about the split that had been developing since the beginning of the year.

Chapter Four Endnotes

1. El Paso Herald, April 23, 1914, p. 1.
2. El Paso Herald, April 24, 1914, p. 8.
3. United States Department of State, Record of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929, Special Agent George Carothers to Secretary of States, File 812.00/11618, April 22, 1914, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington D. D. (Hereafter cited as, RDS, RG 59, NA.) El Paso Herald, April 23, 1914, pps. 1-2 and April 24, 1914, pps. 2, 8. The New York Times, April 23, 1914, p. 1. Vida Nueva, April 22, 1914, p. 1 and April 23, 1914, p. 1.
4. The New York Times, March 13, 1914, p. 2.
5. Vida Nueva, Extra, April 11, 1914,, p. 1. Martin Luis Guzmán. The Memoirs of Pancho Villa, Translated by Virginia Taylor, Austin, University of Texas press, 1965, p. 137. (Hereafter cited as, Guzmán. Memoirs.)
6. RDS, Carothers to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11755, April 12, 1914, RG 59, NA.
7. RDS, Carothers to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11755, April 12, 1914, and Carothers to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11461, April 9, 1914, RG 59, NA. Vida Nueva, April 15, 1914, p. 2.
8. "Pense luego, este hombre no nos llevará a buen fin: dió ya en su vida cuanto bueno podía dar." Quoted in, Silvestre Terrazas, "El Verdadero Pancho Villa", Capítulo 34, Boletín de Sociedad Chihuahuense de Estudios Históricos, Tomo 7, Enero y Febrero de 1950, p. 362.
9. As cited in, Charles Cumberland. Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1972, p. 128. (Hereafter cited as, Cumberland, Constitutionalist Years.)
10. Silvestre Terrazas, "El Verdadero Pancho Villa", Capítulo 31, Boletín de Sociedad Chihuahuense de Estudios Históricos, Tomo 6, Septiembre de 1949, pps. 290-291. Robert Quirk. The Mexican Revolution 1914-1915: The Convention of Aguascalientes,

Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 18.
(Hereafter cited as, Quirk. Convention of Aguascalientes.)

11. The New York Times, April 11, 1914, p. 1. RDS, Admiral Henry Mayo to Mexican General Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza, File 812.00/11510, April 13, 1914, and Admiral Frank Fletcher to Secretary of Navy, File 812.00/11519, April 13, 1914, RG 59, NA. Edith O'Shaughnessy. A Diplomats Wife in Mexico, New York, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1916, p. 261. (Hereafter cited as, O'Shaughnessy. Diplomat's Wife.)
12. The New York Times, April 11, 1914, p. 1. RDS, Mayo to Zaragoza, File 812.00/11510, April 13, 1914, and Fletcher to Secretary of Navy, File 812.00/11519, April 13, 1914, RG 59, NA. Robert Quirk. An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz, W. W. Norton and Co., INC., New York, 1967, p. 7. (Hereafter cited as, Quirk. An Affair of Honor.)
13. The New York Times, April 14, 1914, p. 1.
14. RDS, Mayo to Zaragoza, File 812.00/11510, April 13, 1914, Fletcher to Secretary of Navy, File 812.00/11519, April 13, 1914, and Charge d'Affairs at Mexico City, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11522, April 15, 1914, RG 59, NA. United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Washington D. C., Government Printing Office, 1922, Admiral Mayo to General Zaragoza, File 812.00/11988, April 9, 1914, p. 448. (Hereafter cited as, Foreign Relations.) The Nation, Vol. 98, April 23, 1914, p. 451. Samuel Blythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with President Wilson", The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 186, May 23, 1914, p. 4. (Hereafter cited as, Blythe, "A Conversation with President Wilson.") Quirk. An Affair of Honor, p. 8.
15. RDS, Secretary of State to O'Shaughnessy, File 812.00/11532, April 17, 1914, RG 59, NA.
16. Ibid.
17. Direct quote, RDS, O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11522, April 15, 1914 and O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11532, April 16, 1914, RG 59, NA. Vida Nueva, April 16, 1914, pps. 1-2.
18. Vida Nueva, April 17, 1914, p. 1. RDS, O'Shaughnessy

- to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11552, April 19, 1914, O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11540, April 17, 1914, Secretary of State to O'Shaughnessy, File 812.00/11540, April 18, 1914, O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11553, April 19, 1914, O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11555, April 18, 1914, and Secretary of State to O'Shaughnessy, File 812.00/11555, April 19, 1914, RG 59, NA.
19. The arrest of the Mail orderly resulted from an altercation with a Mexican Federal soldier. Neither could speak the others language and a policeman took them both to the station house. Once there the Jefe Politico released the mail orderly and detained the soldier. Admiral Fletcher at the time believed that the Mexicans had acted correctly in the incident. See, Foreign Relations, Consul at Veracruz to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11478, April 12, 1914, p. 455 and Fletcher to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11988, April 16, 1914, p. 465. O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, p. 269.
 20. Vida Nueva, April 16, 1914, p. 2. RDS, Secretary of State to O'Shaughnessy, File 812.00/11578a, April 20, 1914, RG 59, NA. The Nation, Vol. 98, April 23, 1914, p. 451. Foreign Relations, Secretary of State to O'Shaughnessy, File 812.00/11634c, April 20, 1914, p. 476 and President Wilson to Joint Session of Congress, 63d Congress, 2d Session, House Document no. 910, April 20, 1914, pps. 474-476.
 21. The entire account of the travels of the Ypiranga can be found in, Michael Meyer, "The Arms of the Ypiranga", Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 30, August 1970, pps. 546-566, (Hereafter cited as, Meyer, "Arms of the Ypiranga.") Canada had sent word of the Ypiranga's arrival for the twenty-first on the eighteenth.
 22. Meyer, "The Arms of the Ypiranga", p. 551. Foreign Relations, Secretary of State to Consul at Veracruz, File 812.00/11633b, April 21, 1914, p. 477 and Consul at Veracruz to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11547,11564, April 20, 1914, p. 477.
 23. RDS, Consul at Veracruz to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11594, April 21, 1914, Consul at Veracruz to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11598, April 21, 1914, Consul at Veracruz to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11602, April 22, 1914 and Secretary of Navy to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11578, April 20, 1914,

- RG 59, NA. O'Shaughnessy. Diplomat's Wife, p. 288. The New York Times, April 22, 1914, p. 1. Foreign Relations, Consul at Veracruz to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11599, April 22, 1914, p. 480.
24. RDS, Consul at Veracruz to Secretary of State, File 812.00/12977, August 11, 1914, RG 59, NA. Meyer, "The Arms of the Ypiranga", pps. 552-554.
25. El Paso Herald, April 22, 1914, p. 1.
26. El Paso Herald, April 23, 1914, pps. 2, 5. Vida Nueva, April 21, 1914, pps. 1-2. The London Times, April 24, 1914, pps. 7-8. Quirk. Convention of Aguascalientes, pp 2. 35-36.
27. El Paso Herald, April 23, 1914, pps. 1-2 and April 24, 1914, p. 2. The New York Times, April 23, 1914, p. 1. Vida Nueva, April 22, 1914, p. 1 and April 23, 1914, p. 1. RDS, Carothers to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11618, April 22, 1914, RG 59, NA.
28. "Our Debt to Villa", Literary Digest, Vol. 448, May 16, 1914, p. 1166.
29. Ibid. El Paso Herald, April 22, 1914, pps. 1 and April 24, 1914, p. 8. Vida Nueva, April 20, 1914, p. 1. RDS, Carothers to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11654, April 23, 1914 and Collector of Customs at El Paso, Texas, Zachary Cobb to Secretary of State, Letter from Francisco Villa, File 812.00/11714, April 25, 1914, RG 59, NA.
30. El Paso Herald, April 24, 1914, p. 8.
31. El Paso Herald, April 23, 1914, p. 1, April 24, 1914, p. 8, April 25, 1914, p. 1, and April 27, 1914, p. 2. Vida Nueva, April 24, 1914, p. 1-2.
32. RDS, Carothers to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11770, April 29, 1914, RG 59, NA. Vida Nueva, April 29, 1914, p. 1 and April 30, 1914, p. 1. El Paso Herald, April 29, 1914, p. 1.
33. El Paso Herald, April 23, 1914, p. 5.
34. El Paso Herald, April 24, 1914, p. 1. RDS, Carothers to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11596, April 21, 1914, Hamm to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11837, April 24, 1914, and Carothers to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11875, May 10, 1914, RG 59, NA. The London Times, April 25, 1914, p. 8. The Nation, Vol.

98, April 30, 1914, pps. 487-488.

35. El Paso Herald, April 27, 1914, p. 2 and April 29, 1914, p. 1. Vida Nueva, April 28, 1914, p. 1-2. The Nation, Vol. 98, April 30, 1914, pps 487-488, Vol. 98, May 21, 1914, p. 590, and Vol. 98, June 25, 1914, p. 740. Blythe, "A Conversation with President Wilson", p. 4.
36. Periódico Oficial del Gobierno Constitucionalista del Estado de Chihuahua, Secretaría del Gobierno Estado de Chihuahua, Encargo: Lic. Armando Almeida Martínez, 1914, Diciembre 21, 1913, pps. 2-3. Guzmán. Memoirs, pps. 123, 127.
37. Cumberland. The Constitutionalist Years, p. 130. Silvestre Terrazas, "El Verdadero Pancho Villa", Capítulo 34, Boletín de Sociedad Chihuahuense de Estudios Históricos, Tomo 7, Enero y Febrero de 1950, p. 363-365. El Paso Herald, April 27, 1914, p. 5 and May 6, 1914, p. 7. Guzmán. Memoirs, p. 189.
38. Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years), p. 130. El Paso Herald, April 27, 1914, p. 5, May 9-10, 1914, p. 3A, May 11, 1914, p. 2, and May 12, 1914, p. 5. Guzmán. Memoirs, p. 189.

CHAPTER FIVE

"Señor . . . You are a Son of a Bitch"

For over five hours the generals of the División del Norte had considered, coded, and decoded the telegraphs from and to Venustiano Carranza. The man refused to listen to their explanations. Finally their leader, Pancho Villa had had enough and instructed the telegraph operator to send the message. "Señor I resign the command of this Division. Tell me whom to deliver it," wired Villa to Carranza during the¹ six hour telegraphic conference on June 13, 1914. Carranza replied: "Although with true pain, I am obliged to accept your retirement from the command as Chief of the Division of the North, I give to you the thanks in the name of the Nation, for the important services that you have presented to our cause . . ."² Carranza's attitude outraged Villa's generals. They believed that Villa's threatened resignation would force Carranza to concede to their demands. But they should have anticipated Carranza's response. Maclovio Herrera told the telegrapher to send the following; "Señor Carranza I am informed of your treatment of my General Francisco Villa. You are a son of a bitch. Maclovio Herrera!"³ Herrera's determination to send the telegram was backed up by his gun, but General Felipe Angeles was able to calm the situation and the telegram was not sent.

Nevertheless the definitive split between Pancho Villa and Venustiano Carranza had arrived.⁴

The split between Carranza and Villa that had been developing since February 1914 found its outlet in June 1914 over the conduct of the military campaign south against Huerta. Carranza decided that the time had come to limit Villa's role to the area he controlled in the north. His first strategy in that direction involved a two pronged movement. First, he diverted Villa from moving south out of Torreón and sent him east to attack Saltillo. Next the First Chief promoted Pánfilo Natera to command the newly formed Central Division and assigned him the task of the attack on Zacatecas, the last huertista stronghold before Mexico City. Villa for his part accepted the Saltillo assignment but when he easily chased the Federal Army from there, he again began to prepare to move south. At this point the goals of Villa and Carranza began to conflict. Only their desire to defeat Huerta, their common enemy, averted actual military conflict. Efforts by those surrounding both men then extended the period before an outright split, but the die was cast and the two primary leaders of the Constitutionalist Revolution inched toward open warfare.

Villa's military success against the Federals from Juárez to Torreón proved that Huerta's control of Mexico was fast crumbling. Huerta had held out longer than most people believed possible and against tremendous odds. He displayed

good qualities, being tenacious and calm in the face of constant difficulty. In early May he still held sway over a vast portion of Mexico. Villa's recapture of Torreón in late March and early April gave the rebels a strategic position on the Mexican Central Railroad, but that was barely outside the state of Chihuahua. Huerta still held the capital of Coahuila, Saltillo - Carranza's home state - and the concentration of troops at Zacatecas blocked Villa's path south. The situation had deteriorated but not yet to a critical level. The Constitutionalists needed to drive the federales from these two cities in order to make the Revolution militarily dominant.

Carranza moved his headquarters from Ciudad Chihuahua to Torreón in May. When he arrived Villa proudly showed the First Chief his preparations for the advance south on Zacatecas. Carranza disapproved and informed Villa that all future military plans needed to be submitted for approval to a commission recently formed by the First Chief. The motives behind Carranza's position stemmed from Villa's military successes. Carranza believed that the revolution would better profit from one of the other generals investing Mexico City. Carranza wanted the honor to go to Alvaro Obregón and the division of the Northwest, but the former needed time to make the overland journey from Tepic to Guadalajara. Villa's ability to use the Mexican Central to move on the Capital worried Carranza, and, for this reason,

he ordered Villa to advance on Saltillo. Villa argued that Saltillo fell into the jurisdiction of Pablo González' Division of the Northeast and that he should continue his preparations for the Zacatecas campaign. Carranza remained adamant on Saltillo and Villa reluctantly agreed.⁶

Carranza's political maneuvering disgusted Villa. Formerly Villa had left the political arena to men such as Silvestre Terrazas, Felipe Angeles, and Roque González Garza but, out of necessity, began to take a greater interest in the Byzantine procedures. Villa believed that the politicians around Carranza caused this problem and accepted the responsibility of attacking Saltillo in order not to precipitate tension between himself and the First Chief. Villa directed his forces in the attack on Saltillo on the 19th-21st of May. A massed cavalry attack on the city of Paredon, between Torreón and Saltillo, sent the Federales fleeing. The defenders quickly evacuated Saltillo when Villa's forces continued to advance. Villa entered Saltillo on the twenty-first. He then delivered to Carranza the capital of the State of which the the First Chief was constitutional governor. Carranza again transferred his government, this time to the place he had evacuated more than a year before.⁷

Villa returned to Torreón on the twenty-ninth of May, leaving only a 5000 man garrison in Saltillo, again to prepare for his advance on Zacatecas. When he arrived in

Torreón his advisors told him that Pánfilo Natera and the Arrieta brothers, Domingo and Mariano, had already begun to move on Zacatecas. They informed him that Carranza had created a new division, the Central, outside of Villa's military provenance. Villa's advisors also told him about Carranza's appointment of Natera as commander of the Central Division in an attempt to woo Natera away from Villa's influence. Villa could not understand how Carranza thought that Natera with 6,000 men could take Zacatecas when the whole División del Norte, 15,000 men strong, had trouble taking Torreón. Villa decided to continue preparations for his own advance. At this point friction between Villa and Carranza was minimal. Villa reported on June 5 that Natera's commission did not threaten him because he never claimed to be commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces, just of the División del Norte.⁸

Relations between Villa and Carranza were strained though. Carranza still wanted to curtail Villa's activities south of Torreón and did this by withholding ammunition and supplies. United States Consul to Chihuahua, Marion Letcher, reported that Carranza's aim was to limit Villa's power to the State of Chihuahua where the "Centaur of the North" had total control anyway. Letcher further claimed that the other generals agreed with Carranza and viewed Villa as a menace to Mexico. Villa, thought Special Agent George Carothers, would continue to be patient with Carranza

but if trouble was forced on him, he would act decisively.

On June 10 Carranza wired Villa ordering the latter to be ready to aid Natera if it became necessary. The next day Natera began the assault on Zacatecas but quickly realized that he needed more men. Ten to twelve thousand federales defended the city. On June 11 another cable arrived telling Villa to send 3000 men to reinforce Natera. Villa replied that he believed that his whole division should move. On June 12 Carranza cabled back that instead of 3000 men, Villa should send 5000 men under the command of José Isabel Robles. He should also send any ammunition that he could spare. Villa sent back word that Robles was sick and that he had already given the order to prepare for the move on Zacatecas. Villa realized that Carranza was intriguing against him and arranged a telegraphic conference for June 13, 1914.¹⁰

On the 13th Villa opened the conference by asking Carranza who ordered Natera to begin the attack on Zacatecas with insufficient forces. He continued by informing the First Chief that he needed at least five days before he could send reinforcements to Natera because his troops needed time to rest after the Saltillo campaign. Furthermore, he needed time to resupply his forces. He told Carranza that Robles could not lead the troops because he was sick and that Tomás Urbina was not a good choice because of animosity between himself and the Arrieta brothers. If

Carranza wished someone else to lead the division, Villa would permit it, if he felt the replacement could do the job. He also questioned Carranza as to who would be overall leader when he reached Zacatecas, him or Natera.¹¹

Carranza responded that he ordered the attack on Zacatecas. He told Villa that according to General Arrieta the rebels had taken good positions outside the city. The First Chief then began to instruct Villa on the art of war. He told Villa that he had made a mistake in the battle for Ciudad Chihuahua and after a few days of fighting had to retreat. Then before the second battle of Torreón, Carranza ordered the troops of Robles, Contreras, Urbina and other forces under officers of lesser grade to assist Villa and only by those orders was Villa able to take that city. Carranza now found it necessary to order Villa to send troops to reinforce Natera. He did not order Villa himself to go, and thus the question of whether Villa would be subordinate to Natera was moot. In reply to Villa's veiled threat to resign, Carranza hoped that the general would not. But as First Chief he felt honor bound to accept it, if it were tendered. Carranza also told Villa that if Robles was sick,¹² one of his other generals could lead the reinforcements.

At this point Villa resigned his position as General in Chief of the División del Norte. Carothers reported that Carranza was overjoyed that the breach had come. He refused

to listen to any of the Special Agent's reasoning to rescind the acceptance of the resignation. He requested that Villa suggest who should take command of the forces, and that Generals Felipe Angeles, José Robles, Tomás Urbina, Calixto Contreras, Eugenio Aguirre Benavides, Severiano Ceniceros, Jose Rodríguez, Maclovio Herrera, Toribio Ortega, Martiniano Servin, and Maximo Garcia remain at the telegraph office to confer with him. Villa left the station. Carranza telegraphed the above mentioned generals that they should chose an interim replacement for Villa from among themselves. If there was someone else who could do the job about whom he was uninformed, they should tell him. The generals requested the First Chief to reconsider his decision to accept Villa's resignation. They believed that a split at this time would have serious consequences both inside the country and out. Carranza remained adamant. He told the generals that before accepting their leaders' resignation he did consider the consequences and decided to accept the resignation. They now should choose a successor¹³ and carry out his order to move on Zacatecas.

Carranza's acceptance of Villa's resignation put Villa's generals in a difficult position. They all considered resigning but decided that it was Villa's duty to reassume command of the division. They conveyed all this to Carranza and advised him to accept their decision in order to destroy their common enemy. Carranza replied that he

could not change his decision because of the effect it could have on discipline within the ranks. Three days earlier he ordered Villa to send reinforcements to Natera, and it still had not been done. He did not command the whole division to go just the forces under Generals Contreras, Robles, Pereyra, Aguirre Benavides, and García Carrillo, which the First Chief did not consider part of the Division of the North anyway. Carranza believed that their decision to retain Villa came under pressure from the latter and that they should order the attack outside of Villa's presence.¹⁴ That ended the telegraphic conference.

The telegraphic conference lasted for six hours because of the need to keep the matter private, so all the telegraphs were in code. For a short while Carranza believed he had finally bottled up Villa in the North. The First Chief ordered Villa to assume the Governorship of Chihuahua, but this only reflected Villa's true position in the state. Yet Carranza did not take into consideration the attitude of Villa's subordinates. Carranza's position put Villa's lieutenants in a dilemma: disloyalty to Villa or revolt against Carranza. They chose the latter. On the fourteenth Villa's generals cabled Carranza their decision. They told the First Chief that they had considered their course of action in Villa's absence and then informed Villa of their decision that he remain as their leader. Villa accepted. Moreover, they told Carranza, all the generals

signing were members of the División del Norte, and that included ¹⁵Generals Robles, Contreras, and Aguirre Benavides.

Carranza telegraphed in reply that to solve this problem Generals Angeles, Herrera, Ortega, Aguirre Benavides and Hernández should come to Saltillo the next day to discuss the situation. The generals told Carranza that he did not seem to understand their last two messages. They had convinced Villa that for the good of the country he must remain in command of the division. They knew that Carranza wanted to curtail Villa's authority, but they would not allow it. The Generals felt that Carranza was questioning their conduct as men, but they did not consider their action as traitorous. They could not meet with the First Chief the ¹⁶next day because the division was moving on Zacatecas.

That evening Manuel Chao arrived in Torreón with three hundred men. When he heard of Carranza's attitude toward Villa he sent a telegram of his own to the First Chief. Chao informed Carranza that he supported the generals in everything they had done. Yet Carranza refused to let the matter drop. He withheld coal shipments to Villa from the Coahuila mines, and thus Villa had to get his coal from El Paso. This became impossible after June 16 because two bridges washed out between Torreón and Juárez. Both sides discontinued sending rolling stock for fear of not getting it back. It seemed as if nothing could get Villa and

Carranza moving in the same direction again.

On the fifteenth villista officials deposed all Carranza supporters in Juárez. Villista forces took control of the telegraphic and customs offices in Juárez and arrested all Carranza supporters. Villa's control now extended from Juárez to Torreón. The Constitutionalist treasury in Juárez also was confiscated by villista officials. But by the 18th Villa and Carranza had come to an agreement to postpone their differences until after the conclusion of the campaign against Huerta. Villa would have absolute control of military affairs, while Carranza retained control of civilian matters. All the carrancistas arrested by Villa were released and they took up their old jobs. Villa also ordered the Constitutionalist treasury returned.¹⁸

Villa's arrival at Zacatecas on the twentieth of June gave the rebels a two to one advantage over the federales. Natera's first attack on June 12 was repelled because of federale numerical superiority. The federals had 10,000 well fortified men compared to Natera's 6,000 poorly supplied forces. Villa's forces, though, cast the deciding role in the battle. Zacatecas fell on the afternoon of the twenty-third. Special Agent León Canova gave a chilling account of the looting and pillaging of Zacatecas. In the days that it required to dispose of the rotting corpses, dogs and pigs feasted on the human carrion. On the

twenty-fifth Villa ordered all priests arrested and placed a 100,000 peso ransom upon their release. The citizens of Zacatecas collected the complete amount by the thirtieth and Villa released the clergy. Yet, the time to settle the differences created by the events that led to the battle had come.¹⁹

After capturing Zacatecas Villa had planned on continuing his move south. Three reasons, however, compelled him to abandon his march on Mexico City. First, Pablo González failed to attack and capture San Luis Potosí. This left his right flank open. Secondly, Carranza refused to supply him with the coal he needed to run the trains necessary to move his army south. The washout of the bridges between Juárez and Chihuahua precluded him from obtaining the coal from the United States. Thirdly, Carranza refused to send Villa ammunition and his forces had used great quantities in capturing Zacatecas. For these reasons he decided to consolidate his holdings, and with the consent of his generals he moved north and distributed his men between Juárez and Torreón. Villa also decided to seize the Constitutionalist treasury again and arrest Carranza's treasurer-general and other carrancista officials in Ciudad Juárez. This put Carranza in a difficult position since Juárez was the main distribution point for Constitutionalist currency. Thus Carranza was willing to work out an arrangement with Villa.²⁰

The day Villa entered Zacatecas (June 23) two lawyers representing General Pablo González met with Villa in an attempt to heal the breach between the First Chief and the "Centaur of the North." Yet Carranza did two things at this time that inhibited the reconciliation process. First he removed Felipe Angeles from the office of Minister of War. Then he promoted Pablo González and Alvaro Obregón to division generals. He excluded Villa from this honor even though Villa had a larger and better equipped army than either of the other two. González' and Villa's representatives met and arranged a conference between the generals of the North (Villa) and Northeast (Gonzalez) to be held in Torreón. Villa and González agreed to have representatives of their divisions meet on July 4, to settle²¹ the differences between the First Chief and Villa.

Before González agreed to the meeting he met with Carranza. Carranza gave his consent to the conference but only if González kept secret the consultation with him. When asked about the conference, Carranza denied sending the commission of generals, but said he would not place obstacles in the way of a settlement. He put the blame for the bad relations on Villa for not being obedient or disciplined. But the First Chief agreed to overlook Villa's past transgressions if the latter restrained his passions and recognized constituted authority. If Villa refused to control his passions, Carranza believed that the former

would be a menace to the revolution. Carranza told Special Agent Canova: "If his excesses are tolerated and condoned today he will be a peril tomorrow."²² The delegation from the division of the Northeast arrived in Torreón on July 4, and the conference lasted until the eighth. Villa and Gonzalez signed the resulting "Pact of Torreón" the next day.²³

The "Pact of Torreón" provided a means to bring the villista and carrancista factions back together. It provided for the release of the forty odd prisoners and money taken in Juárez. Carranza retained his position as First Chief of the revolution, but his authority would be limited to civilian and diplomatic affairs. It also proposed the calling of a convention of the military leaders following the conclusion of the revolution with representation based on one delegate per 1000 troops. It also advised that the interim president be a civilian. Villa wrote up a list of delegates that he would be willing to accept in Carranza's cabinet. The resulting agreement constituted a very mild compromise, with both sides giving up very little. Yet the commission did not settle the dispute between Villa and Carranza because Carranza refused to accept it.²⁴

In August 1914, General Felipe Angeles sent Carranza a letter explaining why Villa and his generals did not follow orders concerning the Zacatecas campaign. Angeles told

Carranza that refusal to obey the order did not withdraw recognition of his First Chieftainship; rather, the decision was made only to defeat their common enemy. The tone of the letter began in respectful terms but quickly degenerated to condescension. Villa's decision to keep his forces together, wrote Angeles, only followed a classic rule of war: use all forces available. At this point Angeles began to lecture Carranza on the art of war. Von Molke during the Franco-Prussian war, 1870-1871, found out only too late that he did not have the forces to defeat the French totally. Von Molke concluded that a commander never had enough troops. The note at this point read like a course in military strategy. Carranza could not miss the implication of his own deficiencies in the art of war. This justification did not make matters better. Yet the situation had been deteriorating since the rejection of the "Pact of Torreón".²⁵

On July 15, 1914, Victoriano Huerta resigned as President of Mexico and fled the country. Relations between Villa and Carranza took a turn for the worse following the resignation. Villa insisted on many things following the withdrawal of Huerta. He demanded the disbandment of the federal army and the abolition of hacienda and mining stores. He desired that the power of the clergy be curtailed in fact as well as theory. Yet, relations with Carranza precluded him from pressing any demands. Since the

washout of the bridges linking him to the United States, Villa had to rely on Carranza for supplies. Coal, mined in Northern Coahuila, and some ammunition did come from Carranza for a short time, but after the failed conference at Torreón they stopped. Rumors began to circulate that relations between Villa and Carranza were moving to a critical point.²⁶

Carothers discounted the rumors. In a telegram to the Special Agent, Villa wrote: "I beg to state that my greatest hope is to see peace restored in Mexico . . . that all my vigilance and hardships are towards that only and supreme end, the happiness of my country."²⁷ Villa told Carothers that he would remain loyal to Carranza and would accept anything but isolation. But isolation constituted Carranza's goal with respect to Villa. Villa enraged Carranza further in a matter dealing with constitutionalist money. The ease of counterfeiting villista currency forced Carranza to order Villa to call in the old issue currency of five million pesos and replace it with a better bill. Villa did issue the new bills but only certified the old issue and kept it in use. Thus ten million villista dollars were in circulation rather than just five. On July 20, Villa returned to Ciudad Juárez for one reason - to get ammunition.²⁸

Villa spent the rest of July resupplying and rebuilding his army. Mexican women smuggled 1000 rounds of ammunition

under their dresses from El Paso in the evening hours because there were no woman border guards after 6:00 p.m. and could thus avoid a body search. They received five pesos villista currency per trip. Villa scoured the countryside for men and horses. On July 21, the El Paso Herald reported that Villa had contracted to sell 50,000 head of Terrazas cattle to J. E. Garrett of Corpus Christi, Texas. In order to keep Luis Terrazas' lawyers from blocking the sale, Terrazas received thirty percent of the sale. Since cattle sold for fifteen dollars a head, Villa stood to make 500,000 dollars. As Consul Marion Letcher reported, "Nobody here doubts the purpose of his activity." Villa²⁹ wanted to buy guns.³⁰

The Los Angeles Times reported on July 21, that villista agents had contracted for 260,000 dollars of guns and ammunition in Los Angeles. On July 30, the El Paso Herald reported that 300 new rifles were seen in Juárez, still in the sacking used to smuggle them across the Rio Grande. The army that Villa created became the largest native military group that ever fought in Mexico. Zachary Cobb, collector of Customs at El Paso, Texas, reported that Villa had nearly 50,000 men under arms stretching from Ciudad Juárez to Aguascalientes. Canova viewed the situation with misgivings. He believed that the trouble between Villa and Carranza had never been solved. He thought that the two million rounds that Villa ordered and due to arrive at

Tampico would help clear the atmosphere. Carranza dashed this hope when he ordered the ammunition consigned to Villa held up at Tampico. This was the first time that Carranza gave notice to Villa's military build-up. He had spent the³¹ balance of July negotiating the surrender of Mexico City.

When Huerta resigned on July 15, Francisco Carbajal, former head of the Supreme Court, became president. On July 23, Carranza received a message from a confidential agent in Mexico City for the first time in seventeen months. This signified Carbajal's willingness to enter into negotiations for the surrender of the city. He appointed two delegates to meet with Carranza to discuss terms for transfer of power. Carranza met personally with the delegates and informed them that the surrender must be unconditional. By August 1, negotiations still continued, but it was clear that Carranza would control the capital of Mexico shortly and that the Constitutionalist rebellion had reached a successful conclusion. Yet the unity of the rebel forces³² also had come to an end.

The month of June 1914 became the decisive month for the rebel factions. Carranza's decision to contain Villa's influence to the north had been instituted. Carranza believed that by diverting Villa to Saltillo he would contain him north of Torreón. What Carranza did not count on was Villa's quick victory at the capital of Coahuila. Carranza also hoped that Pánfilo Natera could defeat the

federales at Zacatecas. Yet as opposed to Saltillo, he counted on an easy victory. Villa's resignation of the command of the División del Norte brought only momentary joy to the First Chief. Here he did not take into account the attitude of Villa's subordinates. At every juncture during this critical period, Carranza miscalculated. In the process he achieved the split that had been building since February of that year. Instead of trying to heal the breach in the months of August and September, Carranza permanently opened the split and sent Mexico down the road to civil war.

CHAPTER FIVE ENDNOTES

1. "Estoy resuelto a retirarme de mando de la División. Sírvase decirme a quién la entrego." Quoted in, Francisco Villa. "Justificación de la Desobediencia de los generales de la División del Norte en Torreón, el Mes de Marzo de 1914" in Ejército Constitucionalista División del Norte: Manifiesto del C. Gral. Francisco Villa a la Nación y Documentos que Justifican el Desconocimiento del C. Venustiano Carranza como "Primer Jefe de la Revolución", Chihuahua, Tipografía del Gobierno, 1914, p. 77. Francisco R. Almada Collection, Centro de Información del Estado de Chihuahua. (Hereafter cited as Villa. "Justificación", Documentos.)
2. "Aunque con verdadera pena, me veo obligado a aceptar se retire ud. del mando en jefe de la División del Norte, dando a ud. las gracias en nombre de la nación, por los importantes servicios que ha prestado ud. a nuestra causa." Quoted in, Villa. "Justificación", Documentos, p. 77.
3. Martín Luis Guzmán. The Memoirs of Pancho Villa, Translated by Virginia Taylor, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1965, p. 214. (Hereafter cited as, Guzmán. Memoirs.)
4. United States Department of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington D. C., Special Agent George Carothers to Secretary of State, File 812.00/12228, June 13, 1914. (Hereafter cited as, RDS, RG 59, NA.) Guzmán. Memoirs, pps. 214-215.
5. Vida Nueva, April 2, 1914, p. 1. The Nation, Vol. 98, May 21, 1914, p. 590.
6. RDS, Zachary Cobb, Collector of Customs at El Paso, Texas, to Secretary of State, File 812.00/12023, May 21, 1914, RG 59, NA. Guzmán. Memoirs, p. 192. Villa. "Justificación", Documentos, pps. 38-40. Charles Cumberland. Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1972, pps. 139. (Hereafter cited as, Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years.)
7. RDS, Consul at Brownsville to Secretary of State, File

- 812.00/12031, May 22, 1914 and Carothers to Secretary of State, File 812.00/11875, May 10, 1914, RG 59, NA. Villa. "Justificación", Documentos, p. 41. Robert Quirk. The Mexican Revolution 1914-1915: The Convention of Aguascalientes, Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 1967, p. 29. (Hereafter cited as, Quirk. Convention of Aguascalientes.) Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years, p. 122.
8. RDS, Carothers to Secretary of State, File 812.00/12219, June 10, 1914, RG 59, NA. El Paso Herald, May 25, 1914, p.1 and June 5, 1914, p. 6. Guzmán. Memoirs, pps. 207, 210-212.
 9. RDS, Consul at Chihuahua to Secretary of State, File 812.00/12160, June 4, 1914 and Carothers to Cobb, File 812.00/12219, June 10, 1914, RG 59, NA.
 10. Guzmán. Memoirs, pps. 210-212. The New York Times, June 16, 1914, p.1. Villa. "Justificación", Documentos, pps. 65, 67-69, 71. El Paso Herald, June 11, 1914, p. 1 and June 13-14, p. 3a. Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years, p. 135. Nellie Campobello. Apuntes Sobre la Vida Militar de Francisco Villa, Mexico City, Edición y Distribución Ibero-Americana de Publicaciones, S. A., 1940, pps. 78-79. (Hereafter cited as, Campobello. Apuntes.)
 11. Guzmán. Memoirs, pps. 212-213. Villa. "Justificación", Documentos, pps. 46-47, 72-73.
 12. Guzman. Memoirs, p. 213. Villa. "Justificación", Documentos, pps. 74-76.
 13. RDS, Cobb to Secretary of State, File 812.00/12266, June 16, 1914, RG 59, NA. Guzmán. Memoirs, pps. 216-217. Villa. "Justificación", Documentos, pps. 77, 79-83. Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years, p. 136. Larry Hill. Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's Executive Agents in Mexico, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1973, p. 193. (Hereafter cited as, Hill. Emissaries.)
 14. Quirk, Convention of Aguascalientes, p. 33. Guzmán. Memoirs, pps. 218-219. Villa. "Justificación", Documentos, pps. 85-86.
 15. RDS, Cobb to Secretary of State, File 812.00/12266, June 16, 1914 and Special Agent Leon Canova to Secretary of State, File 812.00/12462, July 2, 1914, RG 59, NA. Guzmán. Memoirs, pps. 219-220. Villa. "Justificación", Documentos, pps. 83-84, 86-87.

16. RDS, Canova to Secretary of State, File 812.00/12462, July 2, 1914, RG 59, NA. Guzmán. Memoirs, pps. 219-220. Villa. "Justificación", Documentos, pps. 87-90. The New York Times, June 17, 1914, p. 1. Cumberland. Constitutionalist Years, p. 136.
17. Villa. "Justificación", Documentos, p. 92.
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CHAPTER SIX

A Criminal Situation

"This situation is criminal, Mr. Canova, for everything possible should be done by both sides to avoid further revolution," said General Alvaro Obregón three days after Pancho Villa withdrew recognition from and denounced Venustiano Carranza as First Chief of the Constitutionalist¹ forces. On September 22, 1914, Villa told Carranza that he could no longer support the latter's position as dictator of Mexico. Villa arrived at this decision from a variety of sources. The fact that Carranza had not assumed the position as interim president but only took on the executive powers in an extra-legal fashion raised Villa's concerns. That, followed by Carranza's blocking Villa's representatives from attending the Conference of Generals in Mexico City, forced Villa to conclude that Carranza wanted to deny Villa and the División del Norte a voice in the restoration of Mexico. The revolutionary coalition, as in² 1912, began to fly apart.

With the controversy over the Zacatecas campaign the developing split between Pancho Villa and Venustiano Carranza arrived. Yet it did not lead immediately to open warfare nor denunciation of Carranza by Villa. Efforts toward healing the breach were attempted by those

surrounding Carranza; but he was unwilling to make any concessions to Villa. Alvaro Obregón assumed the role as negotiator in this crucial period and held the balance of power. His decision to support Carranza and oppose Villa decided the outcome of the military phase of the split. The first active result of the discord occurred in Sonora between Governor José María Maytorena, a villista supporter, and the forces loyal to General Alvaro Obregón. A struggle for control of the state forced Obregón to request that he and Villa go to Sonora to attempt reconciliation between the opposing factions. A temporary truce resulted, but with the two generals in Chihuahua it fell apart and, with it, the last hopes of unity. By the middle of September Villa had had enough of Carranza's political maneuverings and declared himself in opposition to the First Chief. At this point Obregón moved to attempt reconciliation, and the result was the convention of Aguascalientes. Yet the convention did not heal the breach and by early 1915, the two factions moved toward armed conflict and the bloodiest phase of the Mexican Revolution.

Fighting between the federales and the Constitutionalists continued into the month of August. Carranza agreed to meet with Francisco Carbajal's representatives, provided that they be prepared to surrender unconditionally. The representatives brought a variety of conditions. Most importantly, Carbajal wanted the congress

dissolved by Huerta reinstated so that he could resign his position to that body. Carbajal also requested that the congress issue amnesty to the Federal military officers, with the latter retaining their respective ranks. Carranza's unwillingness to discuss conditions brought the conference to a standstill. Carbajal countered that he would be willing to waive all other conditions but amnesty and guarantee of property. Carranza again refused to discuss conditions and negotiations stalled.³

By August 9, 1914, Obregón had closed the distance between his army and Mexico City. On that date he sent formal notice to the federal army that either they surrender or prepare to fight. This prompted the federal army and government to make plans to evacuate the city. The next day Carranza arrived at Obregón's camp outside Mexico City to meet with General José Refugio Villasco to discuss the surrender. He also contacted the Brazilian Minister to Mexico to make preparations to enter the city by force. On the twelfth, Carbajal dissolved his government and fled to Veracruz. The Governor of the Federal District, Eduardo Iturbide, assumed control and prepared to hand the city over to Obregón.⁴

Upon entering Mexico City, Obregón disbanded the Federal Army. He stripped the federales of their weapons and ordered the naval vessels to put into port. Carranza entered the Government Palace for the first time on August

20. Yet, along the route the First Chief encountered a lackluster show of enthusiasm. The next day he notified the State Governors and other federal authorities that he had assumed the executive powers, but did not signify in what capacity. He made one other move upon his entrance into Mexico City. He cut off the means to get to the capital from Zacatecas, and Pancho Villa, by tearing up the railroad tracks between Aguascalientes and Mexico City. Carranza decided to continue his policy of containing Villa to the north and did not invite the army most responsible for the defeat of Huerta to join in the triumphal march through the capital. This obvious affront to Villa and those under his command did nothing to settle conditions between the two men. It cut at the heart of Villa's honor. As the "Centaur of the North" continued to build his army, Carranza dealt with problems concerning Mexico City.

With the arrival of the rebel troops to Mexico City, conditions began to decline. Soldiers reported that they had been promised loot upon the capture of the city and this brought them into conflict with the civil authorities. The revolutionary soldiers resented the police and on August 26, a group of soldiers arrested two on-duty policemen. The soldiers killed one of the civil servants. Pitched battles between the police and rebels commenced, and by the twenty-ninth, as many as forty casualties were reported. Obregón responded by shutting down all civilian tribunals

and thus suspending protection of legal rights. This put the city under martial law and allowed for the commencement of looting. Carranza had trouble in Mexico City, but, more importantly, trouble in Sonora had reached a critical point.⁶

The problem in Sonora began with the opening of the Constitutionalist rebellion. When Governor Maytorena requested sick leave in February 1913, control of the State passed to Obregón as military commander. Maytorena's return was sure to bring conflict. He returned in July 1913 when the Constitutionalists had certain control of the state. Carranza approved of his return because Maytorena had been elected governor of the state under Madero, as the First Chief had been in Coahuila. At the end of May, 1914, reports of fighting between Maytorena and Military Governor, Colonel Plutarco Elías Calles became widespread. Maytorena had dissolved the state legislature upon his return because of a resolution demanding the governor's resignation. Calles, a supporter of Alvaro Obregón, and others called for state legislative elections to end the dictatorship. Yet by the second week of June, the trouble had been minimized. Obregón appointed General Salvador Alvarado to replace Calles as Military Governor and Maytorena was persuaded to disband his troops. The truce lasted until Huerta's fall from power.⁷

As Carranza prepared to occupy Mexico City, Maytorena

and Calles again began to contest for control of Sonora. On August 10, the forces of Maytorena began to move north from Hermosillo toward Santa Ana and Cananea, garrisoned by the forces loyal to Calles. This situation preoccupied the United States' State Department. On the eleventh, Secretary Bryan ordered the United States Consul in Monterrey to confer with Carranza and point out the seriousness of the situation. Calles responded to Maytorena's moves by stationing a small garrison at Santa Ana and moved the bulk of his troops to Nogales. On the thirteenth, Maytorena ordered the arrest of General Alvarado and took him to Hermosillo. The factionalization of the Constitutionalist forces had begun.⁸

As the situation deteriorated, Bryan became more concerned. On August 13, Bryan ordered Carothers to urge Villa to lessen tensions because it was the Secretary's impression that Villa had considerable influence over Maytorena. On August 22, Villa telegraphed Carranza and asked if the latter would send Obregón north so the two generals could confer with Maytorena and try to stop the fighting in Sonora. Villa's request to meet with Obregón showed that he was willing to keep the Constitutionalist factions together even though it would hurt him in the eyes of his Sonoran allies. Carranza granted Villa's request and Obregón arrived in Chihuahua on August 24.⁹

On August 26, Villa and Obregón reached Ciudad Juárez

on their way to Sonora. The rail route through the United States to Nogales, Sonora, was the fastest and the two generals did not have Carranza's theatrical paranoia about leaving the country. Villista officials in Juárez arranged the trip through the good offices of El Paso Collector of Customs, Zachary Cobb, and General John Pershing. The good feeling between Villa and Obregón on their trip north seemed to cement relations between Villa and Carranza. As Cobb expressed it, the openness between the followers of Villa and Carranza ". . . has put a wet blanket completely over the inspired and heretofore too persistent talk of a probable open breach between Carranza and Villa." ¹⁰ The meeting between Obregón, Villa, and Maytorena began on August 29. They quickly worked out a compromise that put Maytorena and Obregón in full command in civilian and military matters respectively. Maytorena was allowed to keep the forces under his command, but Calles' troops passed to General Benjamín Hill. All troops were ordered to remain in place. Juan Cabral replaced General Alvarado as military Governor while Maytorena remained civilian governor. With the compromise complete, Villa and Obregón returned to ¹¹ Chihuahua.

The harmony between Villa and Obregón continued when the two successful generals reached Chihuahua. On September 3, they hammered out a nine point program for the direction Mexico should now take. Canova believed that Villa would

make certain demands on Carranza and if they were not accepted, another revolution was probable. The nine-point program constituted Villa's demands. The first issue concerned Carranza position as executive. Villa and Obregón wanted Carranza to assume the title of interim president. This had a dual purpose. First it would end the extra-legal period, and second, it would disqualify Carranza for election as constitutionalist president. The second point in the program also dealt with the extra-legal state of the current situation. Carranza would as soon as possible appoint federal judges to reestablish a civilian judiciary. The military tribunals would thus cease to exist in civilian matters. The third point had the respective civil or military governors of the states recognizing the authority of the new magistrates. The fourth point would end the extra-legal period by calling for local elections which would be authorized by the newly appointed magistrates. These four points envisioned the end of Carranza's position outside the constitution, the remaining five dealt with revisions of the constitution.¹²

The fifth point called for election of state governors to replace military governors where applicable. Thus Maytorena and Carranza would retain their positions in Sonora and Coahuila respectively. The sixth point eliminated the office of vice-president. This position became a part of the Mexican political system during the

porfiriato and did not constitute a part of the original constitution of 1857. The call for elections for constitutional president, following the completion of the above points, constituted the seventh point. The eighth point in the program disqualified all provisional officials from running for permanent positions. The ninth point dealt with the agrarian reform issue. Villa and Obregón called on Carranza to have the interim governors designate representatives to meet in Mexico City to study and make suggestions for resolution of the agrarian problem. The program did not ask for anything too radical and seemed to be consistent with the Plan de Guadalupe. Once finished, Obregón prepared to return to Mexico City. The problem with the program, like the Pact of Torreón, revolved around its acceptance or rejection.

Obregón delivered the nine point protocol on September 7. Carranza did not respond until September 13, and stated that the questions addressed could not be answered by so small a group of men, meaning Villa, Obregón, and Carranza. The First Chief agreed to the first point, but his reply stated that all the points must be taken up at the conference of generals he had called to take place in Mexico City on or around October 1. On September 4, Carranza invited Villa to the convention in his position as military governor of Chihuahua. Villa replied that the sentiment of the generals of the División del Norte was against the

convention. Villa wrote that it was true that the Pact of Torreón proposed the convention but since it was not a part of the Plan de Guadalupe he believed that it should not meet. Villa believed that the most important thing to be done was to establish a provisional government to restore order. Furthermore, he felt that the convention would subjugate the agrarian issue to lesser problems. Further events in Sonora ultimately changed Villa's attitude towards the convention and brought Obregón back to Chihuahua.¹⁴

The Sonoran accord broke down in the second week of September. Calles did not fulfill his end of the compromise and armed struggle broke out again. This forced Obregón's return to Chihuahua on the thirteenth, the same day that Carranza rejected the Villa-Obregon protocol. Obregón returned to Chihuahua believing that war with Villa was inevitable and hoped to use the meeting to wean away some of Villa's troops. On the sixteenth, Mexican Independence day, Villa treated Obregón to a review of the troops in Chihuahua. Villa had 19,000 well equipped troops parade past him and Obregón. Obregón, in return, planned a dance for the officers of the División del Norte for the next evening. Yet further troubles in Sonora almost cancelled the dance--and Obregón's life.¹⁵

On the seventeenth Villa and Obregón were discussing the Sonoran problem when a telegram arrived informing the former that a bridge near Nogales was burned by the forces

of General Hill. While in Chihuahua, Obregón had ordered Hill to leave Sonora, but the latter stayed because he believed the order had come under pressure from Villa. Villa flew into a rage. He told Obregón that he was going to kill him for not ordering Hill to leave Sonora. A squad of soldiers surrounded the house where the two men argued, ready to carry out Villa's orders. Canova overheard part of the argument since he was outside the room waiting to see Villa. He heard Villa raging over Hill's presence in Sonora. Canova quickly left because he did not want to appear to be eavesdropping. When Villa reached the height of his fury, Obregón reportedly said: "Since I gave my life to the service of the revolution I consider it will be fortunate for me to lose it."¹⁶ Villa then left the room. He returned a hour later and told Obregón that he was not going to kill him. He told the Sonoran to come to the dance with him, calling him compañerito, (little buddy) and they stayed at the dance until all hours of the morning. Yet Obregón's life remained at risk. Carranza's actions assured the uncertainty of Obregón's survival.¹⁷

As late as September 21, Villa still had not accepted the invitation to the generals conference in Mexico City. Yet later in the day Obregón convinced him that his absence from the conference would allow Carranza to dominate it. Thus Villa decide to send representatives to Mexico City accompanied by Obregón. A special train left Chihuahua at

midnight of the twenty-first for the capital. Yet when the train reached Torreón it could go no further because Carranza had closed the road to Mexico City. Villa believed that Carranza wanted to keep him from attending the conference and decided to renounce his recognition of Carranza. He informed Carranza of his decision and the next day Villa told the people of Chihuahua: "We have decided to fight only against the personality of Venustiano Carranza." ¹⁸ Maytorena responded by announcing his ¹⁹ opposition to Carranza on the twenty-third.

Villa and his staff immediately began to prepare a "Manifesto to the Mexican People" stating his reasons for denouncing Carranza as First Chief. On September 25, Canova saw a copy of the rough draft. The "Manifesto" began by arguing that the provisions of the Plan de Guadalupe were not being carried out. Carranza refused to assume the position of interim president as promised by the Plan. The armies of the North and Northeast had reached a compromise in Torreón but Carranza refused to accept it. The same compromise agreed to a convention to meet in Mexico City, but Carranza stopped traffic from the north by destroying the railroad tracks out of Aguascalientes, cutting off villista delegates from attending. With these affronts to Villa and the Mexican people, the "Manifesto" invited all Mexicans to withdraw recognition from Carranza, to join Villa in removing the executive power from the former First

Chief, and once the first two conditions were met, to appoint a civilian interim president. Villa released the final draft of the "Manifesto" on September 29, and Carranza²⁰ immediately responded to the charges.

Carranza's reply consisted of seven points. First he stated that his only desire was to pass on the executive power as soon as possible. Second, only the revolutionary chiefs could receive the power he was willing to relinquish. Third, the convention of Generals should be the depository of the executive power. Fourth, all factions needed to be represented at the convention. Carranza believed that the first duty of the convention was to ask for Villa's resignation, and that constituted the fifth point. The sixth point stated Carranza's willingness to retire if the convention allowed it. Seventh, Carranza charged that Villa represented the voice of reaction and thus the people of Mexico should oppose the former bandit. Yet all this occurred after Carranza cut off the route south²¹ and stranded Obregón in villista territory.

The train carrying Obregón and Villa's representatives returned to Chihuahua on the twenty-third, with Obregón still not out of danger. The day before Canova met with Villa to see when he was going to let Obregón return to the capital. Canova told Villa that it would be wise to let the Sonoran return to Mexico City because the latter could use his influence on the First Chief. Canova believed that Villa

would not execute Obregón unless Carranza once again inflamed him. Villa then told the special agent that Obregón would be leaving that day. Unknown to Canova, Villa intended to have Obregón killed enroute to Mexico City. Villa sent General Aguirre Benavides an order to stop the train and shoot the Sonoran. Obregón's chief of Staff told Canova that he did not know what Villa intended for them but they were ready to die for the good of the country. As for Obregón, he was more despondent over the prospect of another revolution than his own fate. But when Aguirre Benavides stopped the train enroute south, he and General José Isabel Robles decided to let it continue without carrying out Villa's orders. Obregón reached the relative safety of Zacatecas on the twenty-fourth and returned to the capital two days later. But the dispute with Villa was not Carranza's only problem in September.

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The agrarian revolt of Emiliano Zapata had continued throughout Huerta's reign. Constantly harassing the suburbs of Mexico City, Zapata never had the organization to drive very far into the city. When Huerta resigned, the federales continued to block the zapatista entrance into the capital. Rumors circulated that Carranza compromised with the federales in order to keep the zapatistas out of the city until the Constitutionalist armies could occupy it. Early in September, carrancista agents contacted agents of Zapata hoping to bring the Morelos rebel into the Constitutionalist

camp. Zapata put three conditions on further negotiations with the carrancistas. First, Carranza had to accept the Plan de Ayala apropos of agrarian matters. Second, zapatista representatives must share executive power with Carranza. Third, Carranza would have to meet with Zapata in zapatista territory. Carranza's refusal to accept these conditions cut off any hope for an alliance with Zapata. Yet Carranza's agents saw villista agents there and they were well received. This, though, did not change the First Chief's attitude, and he cut off all ties to the Morelos revolutionary.²³

Carranza now found himself with adversaries on two fronts. When Villa withdrew recognition from Carranza he sent a telegram to Durango telling the Arrieta brothers of his decision and demanded that they declare one way or another. Villa needed to know where they placed their loyalty because they would constitute a threat to his line of supply if they opposed him. They did, and Villa responded by ordering the forces of Calixto Contreras to drive the Arrietas from the city of Durango. Once this had been accomplished, Villa moved south into Zacatecas and extended his control of north-central Mexico from Ciudad Juárez to a position nearer the capital. Obregón, upon arriving in Mexico City realized that something had to be done and agreed to meet with villista representatives in the neutral city of Aguascalientes. On the thirtieth, Obregón

informed Carranza that a compromise was reached for all the factions of the revolution to meet on October 10, in Aguascalientes. But first the carrancistas had to meet in Mexico City and approve of the decision, and Obregón quickly returned to the capital to ensure acceptance of the decision.²⁴

Two orders of business concerned the five day convention in Mexico City: Carranza's resignation and moving the covention to Aguascalientes. Carranza offered to resign his control of the executive power but since the convention was made up of only carrancista delegates the First Chief knew that he had nothing to worry about. The convention unanimously rejected Carranza's resignation. Then the question of moving the convention to Aguascalientes was discussed. Obregón believed that only this change in locations could stop continued civil war. He convinced the assembly and they voted to send delegates to Aguascalientes based on the formula in the Pact of Torreón. The delegates then adjourned the meeting, agreeing to meet on October 10.²⁵

The convention of Aguascalientes contained considerable excitement but little substance. Yet all factions were represented and all made an honest attempt to solve the problems of factionalism in Mexico. Because the zapatistas were not originally represented when the convention opened, a commission headed by Felipe Angeles went to Morelos to

invite Zapata to send representatives. On October 21, the convention received a message from Angeles stating that Zapata had accepted and would send a delegation. An advanced delegation arrived on the twenty-seventh headed by Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama who immediately added some fireworks to the convention. His address to the convention began by stating that the representatives should not be constitutionalists, zapatistas or villistas, but Mexicans. He then grabbed the Mexican flag that all the delegates had signed upon arriving and said that the flag represented the triumph of reaction. He said: "The Mexican people respect that standard and so do I. But let's not bring it here so that that rag can cover up certain political maneuvering . .

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." Boos and hisses, punctuated by the sound of pistols and rifles being unlimbered and cocked, greeted Díaz Soto y Gama's reference to "that rag." Yet before being shot by the enraged convention, Díaz Soto y Gama talked himself out of his hole and the delegates began to discuss the agrarian reform platform that the zapatistas representatives
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presented.

Villa's representative, Roque Gonzáles Garza, began to speak of his support of the agrarian principles in the Plan de Ayala. Obregón then questioned whether González Garza spoke for himself or for the entire División del Norte. Gonzalez Garza responded that he would amply address the question by asking those from the División del Norte who

supported the Plan de Ayala to stand. The whole delegation stood. Then he asked that those of the entire convention that supported the Plan to stand up. Some did, but many replied that they had not read it or could not read, a situation that was common, including some among the villista delegation. Without reaching a consensus the convention moved on to the question of the size of the zapatista delegation. The zapatistas said that they had 60,000 men under arms and requested that they be allowed 60 representatives. Obregón responded that at most they had 26,000 men, and if they did have more why had they been²⁸ unable to capture Mexico City. Again nothing was decided.

On October 29-30, the convention took up the matter of Villa's and Carranza's position within the convention. Carranza received an invitation to join the convention as a delegate but refused because, he responded, he was the First Chief and considered a lesser title beneath him. He also sent the convention his conditions for resigning his position as holder of the executive power. He asked the convention to establish a pre-constitutional government to carry out the reforms the country desperately needed and demanded that Villa renounce any candidacy for president or vice-president and resign his position as commander of the División del Norte. He wanted Zapata to retire also and surrender the allegiance of those forces that recognized him as their leader. If these conditions were met, Carranza

would resign. Villa resigned his position but not his control, and the situation began to crumble.²⁹

Throughout the first month of the convention Obregón acted as the moderator between the villista and carranzista factions. Yet by early November he came to realize that Villa had too much control of the proceedings. When the convention ordered Carranza to surrender his position, after electing General Eulalio Gutiérrez as provisional president of Mexico, Carranza refused and was declared in rebellion to the convention on November 10, 1914. Obregón wired Gutiérrez that if the interim president dismissed Villa from his post as commander of the División del Norte then he would adhere to the convention government; if not, he would fight against it. Gutiérrez responded that he considered Carranza in rebellion and had restored Villa to his former position. The last attempt at compromise had failed, the carrancistas left the convention, Carranza fled Mexico City, and the Convention government took over the capital. In January of 1915, Gutiérrez sick of the political purges in Mexico City and his inability to control either Villa or Zapata, fled the Capital and faded from the scene. Nothing was left but civil war.³⁰

Two factors that occurred in August and September of 1914 contributed to Villa's ultimate defeat at the hands of Obregón at the two battles of Celaya, April 6-7, and 13-15, 1915, which effectively destroyed him as a force in Mexico.

The first concerned the outbreak of World War I in August 1914. Obregón studied the results of the battles and learned the effectiveness of barbed wire, entrenchments, and the machine gun. He realized that Villa knew only one strategy for war, charge. At the first battle, Obregón's well entrenched forces repulsed Villa's cavalry charge. The second battle saw Obregón encircle the town with barbed wire, trenches and machine guns. Keeping a cavalry reserve of 7,000 men to counterattack when Villa exhausted his men and ammunition, Obregón destroyed Villa's reputation as unbeatable and routed his army with the counter attack. Villa's army never again achieved the power it had in early 1915.³¹

Yet more importantly, Carranza's recovery of Veracruz from the United States gave him and his generals a base of operations. The United States announced the intention of withdrawing from Veracruz in September, but political maneuvering delayed actual evacuation until November 23. Carranza quickly moved his government there following the evacuation of the United States forces and the Conventions entrance into Mexico City. Veracruz also gave the First Chief the necessary port to supply his army as well as the customs revenues to pay for his supplies. Villa's alliance with Zapata, effected in December of 1914, called for the Morelos revolutionary to drive the First Chief from that strategic position. But because it was so far from Zapata's

stronghold of the mountains of Morelos, he failed to uphold his end of the bargain. Obregón's victories at Celaya ended Villa's role in the outcome of the Mexican revolution.³²

The split between Villa and Carranza created by the circumstances surrounding the battle for Zacatecas was never repaired. Obregón tried to bring harmony between the two factions first in the State of Sonora and then at the convention of Aguascalientes, but Carranza had made his decision to exclude Villa from assisting in directing Mexico towards peace. He felt that if he could keep Villa in the north then his power could ultimately be curbed. He did not realize that Villa had the strength to oppose his control. As in the numerous occasions that Carranza had previously misjudged his opponent, the First Chief again did not realize that Villa had the strength to oppose his rule. Only by the good fortune to have Obregón side with him, did Carranza defeat Villa and maintain his control of Mexico.

CHAPTER SIX ENDNOTES

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Conclusion

The most significant period in the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920 came in the era of the Constitutionalist revolt. The separate groups from the states of Chihuahua, Sonora and Coahuila that joined together to oppose the rule of General Victoriano Huerta stayed together only as long as Huerta remained in power. Once he resigned, events that preceded and followed his tenure in power led to a factionalization of the Constitutionalist forces.

The critical split came between Venustiano Carranza and Francisco "Pancho" Villa. Both men were a product of the porfiriato, the thirty-five year rule of Porfirio Díaz in which Mexico entered the modern world. Personality and social class separated these two men but both found themselves in the revolt to oust Díaz and then again against Huerta. Personality and the different goals each had for the revolution explained in large measure why the two factions ultimately engaged in bloody civil-war. This, however, does not provide the total answer fully. The addition of the actual events and the characters involved in said events further the understanding of the split. Since each was a product of the porfiriato, that becomes the logical place to begin the investigation.

When Porfirio Díaz seized power in 1876, Mexico had just emerged from fifty years of political and social

turmoil. Díaz realized that in those fifty years Mexico had fallen behind the western world in development. He believed that if Mexico were to recoup and take its place in the modern world, development within the country needed to begin. Yet Mexico lacked the necessary investment capital. Thus he turned to foreigners to provide what Mexico could not. This meant that he needed to make Mexico attractive to foreign investors. The picture of Mexico in the 1870's was of an unsafe land resulting from the years of political and social instability. Díaz immediately set out to change this image of Mexico. Using the army and a rural police force, Díaz successfully changed the picture of Mexico, while failing to change the reality. With the new view of a safe Mexico, he could then use other techniques to draw the capital necessary to modernize Mexico.

Francisco Villa and Venustiano Carranza came of age in this period of modernization. Yet they viewed these changes from opposite directions. Carranza came from a well-to-do family and became intimately involved in the status quo. Serving the porfirian system from a variety of posts, he staked his future on the maintenance of that which he served. Villa was born a peon and at an early age turned to banditry. While the image of a bandit-free Mexico was portrayed to the world, in actuality only the main lines of transportation could boast of this freedom. While outside the porfirian system, Villa did not suffer the same

degradation that the majority of the Mexicans did. Never able to settle in one place for long periods, he still led a middle class existence. When political instability returned to Mexico in 1908-1909, each man profited from it.

The rebellion instigated by Francisco I. Madero in 1910 offered Villa legitimacy. The line between bandit and revolutionary was always very fine. When offered a chance to ally himself to a revolution against the system that had cast him beyond the pale, Villa joined gladly. He knew that if successful, the revolution could change him from outlaw to respected war veteran. Carranza's decision to support Madero in 1910 came from ambition and not from a desire to see an end to the system that he had supported his entire life. In the election for governor of his home state of Coahuila in 1908 porfirian support went to his opponent. Only when he had officially lost the election and Madero's rebellion showed signs of success did he throw his weight behind the revolt. With the overthrow of Díaz each achieved their desired ends.

Villa, one of the leaders of the revolution, retired from active military service to the city of Chihuahua. No longer an outlaw, Villa finally married and settled down to an urban life. Carranza gained election to the office that the porfirians denied him. Yet each did not remain tied strictly to their new professions. A rebellion in northern Mexico under the banner of Pascual Orozco led Villa back

into military service. He offered his services to the Governor of Chihuahua, Abraham González, the same man who was instrumental in getting Villa to join Madero. González accepted but Villa did not serve out the entire campaign. Accused by the Federal Military Commander of Chihuahua, Victoriano Huerta, of insubordination, Villa barely escaped death only to go to jail, the one place he had, in the main, avoided throughout his career as an outlaw. Carranza too did not remain strictly tied to his new post.

As governor of Coahuila, Madero's home state, Carranza failed to remain on good terms with the new president. A dispute with the federal government over monetary matters drove Carranza to contemplate rebellion. Gathering together representatives of many northern governors in December of 1912, Carranza tested his support for action against the Madero regime. Fate intervened before any action could be undertaken. A barracks revolt in Mexico City drove Madero from power and elevated General Victoriano Huerta to the presidency of Mexico.

Victoriano Huerta played a variety of roles in the short presidency of Francisco Madero. A porfirian general of ability, Huerta helped crush the only major rebellion against Madero. The events of the Mexico City revolt forced Madero to turn to Huerta to lead the forces still loyal to the government. Yet a deal worked out under the direction of the United States Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane

Wilson, turned Huerta against Madero and thrust him into control of the country. The coup by Huerta may have been accepted by more people within Mexico as well as without had Madero not been murdered. The death of Madero, created a martyr and Huerta faced rebellion against his regime.

The revolt against Huerta centered in the northern states of Sonora, Chihuahua and Coahuila. Each state had its own reasons for not recognizing Huerta as president of Mexico. Each had its own leaders, Villa in Chihuahua, Carranza in Coahuila, and José María Maytorena and Alvaro Obregón in Sonora. They all agreed to unite in common cause. Yet Villa and Carranza did not actually unite because Villa demanded that he retain control of all functions within Chihuahua while Carranza demanded overall control of the revolution. This difference of opinion in leadership was exacerbated by the socio-economic experiences of each man. Carranza viewed Villa as a lower-class bandit and treated him in a condescending manner. While Villa realized his inferiority towards those of the upper class, he reacted negatively to those that treated him as an inferior. Madero treated Villa as an equal and earned his respect, but Carranza did not follow this intelligent example.

Besides this marked difference in social position, each man had a different goal for the revolution. Villa sought a true social revolution. He sympathized with the plight of

the lower-classes and realized their aspirations. Carranza, on the other hand, viewed political change as the major goal. He believed that the constitution that had been misused by Díaz was still valid for Mexico. Only Díaz's misuse caused Mexico's problems. The restoration of that document would solve the problems created during the porfiriato. While these positions crystallized the reasons for the split between Villa and Carranza they do not explain the causes. Only the events of the Constitutionalist Revolution explain the actual causes of the factionalization of the Constitutionalist forces.

The first event that heightened discontent between the two men came from international developments caused by the revolution. The foreign policy of the revolutionists, argued Carranza, was his domain. Yet Villa conducted his own foreign relations within the territory he controlled. Villa believed that the Spanish citizens living in Mexico supported Huerta and thus vented his rage against them. Carranza did support Villa publicly, in this instance, but privately undermined his position. Yet it took the death of William S. Benton, a British citizen to underscore the first real point of contention.

Benton's death brought the United States directly into the events of the split. Forced by the British to intervene in the matter, the United States became intimately involved in the fortunes of the constitutionalist forces. Villa,

implicated in the death, knew that he must try to please the United States but, circumstances made that difficult. Ironically, Carranza came to Villa's defense by denying the northern government diplomatic discussions with Villa. Yet once the dispute was resolved, Villa informed the United States that if Carranza did not resolve diplomatic matters within villista-held territory, they could appeal to him. The events up to and including the Benton Affair showed Carranza that he must go to Chihuahua to attempt to control his nominal subordinate.

Prior to Carranza's arrival in Chihuahua, two men joined Villa who would have an effect on the relations between Villa and Carranza. The first was George Carothers. Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, assigned Carothers, formerly Consul to Torreón, as special executive agent to Villa. Wilson hoped that Carothers could keep Villa from making the same type of mistake that he made in the Benton affair. In the long run Carothers was viewed as a Villa partisan by both the United States State Department and by Carranza. The other man to join Villa was General Felipe Angeles. Angeles was a former porfirian artillery officer who joined Carranza after Madero's overthrow. Carranza made Angeles sub-Secretary of War and granted Villa's request that Angeles join Villa's forces to direct his artillery. In the long run, Carranza would charge that Angeles was a agent for the reaction and directed Villa to

disobey Carranza's orders. Further discontent resulted from the Carranza-Villa meeting in Chihuahua.

This first meeting since the Madero rebellion did more to drive the two men apart than any other event in the dispute. Villa thought that if he opened up to Carranza the two men could resolve any friction that had been generated between them. Yet Carranza at once treated Villa in the manner that most upset Villa and all hopes for harmony was lost. Yet the common enemy Huerta remained and a bargain was reached that allowed both factions to continue fighting the same foe. Another unlikely foe entered the fight against Huerta.

Woodrow Wilson opposed the huertista government from its inception. A mistake by a Mexican Federal officer in the Mexican port of Tampico opened the door for active United States opposition to Huerta. Wilson's stated policy to "watch and wait" for the conclusion to the revolution took its only divergence. In April 1914, the armed forces of the United States occupied the Mexican port of Veracruz, cutting off Huerta's major supply depot and revenue source. But this attempt by the United States to assist the Constitutionalist revolt backfired when Carranza interpreted it as violation of Mexican sovereignty. He demanded that the United States withdraw their troops immediately. Villa refused to assume the same posture. He did not care if the United States controlled the port as long as the Americans

did not expand their control. In this instance, Carranza backed down and took up Villa's position. Yet Carranza had come to the conclusion that Villa could no longer be trusted and would try to contain the latter's control to the State of Chihuahua.

In May of 1914, Villa's war machine had marched as far south as Torreón and began to make preparations for an attack on Zacatecas, the last strongpoint on the road to Mexico City. But Carranza, in his attempt to contain Villa in the north, ordered him east to attack Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila. Villa agreed and successfully drove the federals from that city. In the meantime Carranza assigned another general the attack on Zacatecas. But the Federales repulsed the attack on Zacatecas, and Carranza then ordered Villa to send reinforcements. Villa refused and in a six hour telegraphic conference resigned his position as leader of his division, which Carranza gleefully accepted.

But Carranza did not gain what he wanted because Villa's subordinates would not allow their leader to resign. Instead they convinced Villa to ignore Carranza's orders and lead the division against Zacatecas. Villa's victory there in June of 1914, showed Huerta that his cause was hopeless and the latter resigned on July 15, 1914 and fled Mexico for Europe. Yet in the meantime Villa was unable to follow up his victory. Carranza stopped sending Villa the supplies he needed to move his army and Villa was

contained in the north. The split was now complete, yet further events would be necessary to confirm it.

Villa spent the months of July and August increasing and supplying his army. Carranza spent his time accepting the surrender of Mexico City. When the triumphant rebels marched in victory through the capitol, Villa's troops were noticably absent. Carranza denied the force most responsible for Huerta's defeat to join in the glory of victory, furthering the split between him and Villa. The final event to seal the split had its origins in the state of Sonora.

The Governor of Sonora, José María Maytorena, and the forces of General Alvaro Obregón had been maneuvering for control of the state since May of 1914. Obregón had left the state in the hands of a military governor, Colonel Plutarco Elías Calles, as he fought his way down the western coast of Mexico. Governor Maytorena had taken sick leave at the time of Huerta's coup and his return to Sonora added a new force to the state. In a final attempt to heal the breach between Villa and Carranza as well as the breach in Sonora, Obregón went to Chihuahua to try to work out the Sonoran problem. A bargain was reached in Sonora, and Villa and Obregón hammered out an agreement that would reunite the forces of Villa and Carranza. Yet Carranza refused to honor the agreement and the truce in Sonora fell apart. On September 22, 1914, Villa renounced his loyalty to Carranza. This

confirmed the split.

One further attempt to bring the victorious factions under a single banner took place in Aguascalientes in the form of a convention of the military leaders. Representatives of all the factions, including those of Emiliano Zapata, met to decide the fate of Mexico. An interim president was elected and the course of the future was decided. But Carranza refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of the convention and Villa refused to acknowledge Carranza as leader. Only civil war remained.

The most important period of the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920 came in the era of the Constitutionalist revolt. Once Victoriano Huerta was driven from power the revolution began to factionalize. The critical split came between Venustiano Carranza and Francisco "Pancho" Villa. Both men participated in the revolt against Díaz and then became the leaders in the revolt against Huerta. The course of the revolution and the decisions each made regarding the other add the missing ingredient. All attempts to heal the breach failed because both men had reached the conclusion that the other was a danger to the country. While Villa caused many of the problems that finally brought about the split, his transgressions came out of ignorance. Carranza, on the other hand, actively plotted to exclude Villa from the decision making process. Carranza, with all his formal education, could not discard his prejudice against those of

the lower classes. He accepted them for cannon-fodder but refused to allow them a place in the post-revolutionary hierarchy. Thus Carranza must be assigned the major responsibility for the split. The significance of the split meant that the villistas would be excluded from making decisions on the reconstruction of Mexico. This did not materialize until December of 1916 with work on the new constitution but was clearly evident in September of 1914.

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